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Section 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Thi s Interim Report documents the CARE-Ill mathemati cal model and code 
verification performed by Boeing Computer Services from January 1982 
through November 1982. The mathematical model has been. verified for per-
manent and intermittent faults. The transient fault model has not been 
addressed. The code verification has been performed on CARE-III, Version 
3. A CARE-III Version 4, which corrects deficiencies identified in 
Version 3, is being developed as part of the overall study. 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF PROBLEM 
Fault-tolerant flight control systems (FTFCS) are designed to be ultra-
reliable. Key modules are redundant to a level that makes the probability 
of failure due to spares exhaustion extremely small. These systems are 
designed to mask the faulty operation of a failed module until the system 
can successfully reconfigure with a spare. This masking of the faulty 
module to an observer outside the system comprises the fault-tolerance of 
the system. System failure due to improper masking is called a coverage 
failure. These systems are designed with sufficient redundancy such that 
coverage failure greatly dominates spares exhaustion as the mode of system 
failure. 
The reliability of any proposed FTFCSmust obviously be demonstrated. 
Since the reliability needs to be extremely high, assessment of the relia-
bility must come from engineering analysis ,and reliability modeling. 
Laboratory testing of a system with mean time between failure greater than 
106 hours is obviously not practical. 
For each proposed FTFCS, a reliability model and program could conceivably 
be developed. The alternative is to develop a general reliability program 
which permits the representation of systems with diverse architecture and 
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fault-masking techniques. Under NASA funding, Raytheon has been develop-
ing such a program. CARE-III represents the current level of this sequen-
tial development. 
1.2 CARE-III GENERAL APPROACH 
CARE-III is a reliability program which permits the evaluation of complex 
redundant fault-tolerant systems. The program was designed for the evalu-
ation of FTFCS but is sufficiently general to permit, in principle, use 
for a wide variety of systems. This generality is discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.2. 
The reliability model which CARE-III addresses is a semi-Markov process 
with an unmanageably large number of states. Assumptions about the rela-
tive size of the module failure and coverage parameters permit this de-
tailed micro model to be approximated by a macro Markov model with a 
greatly reduced number of states. Furthermore, replacing detailed inform-
ation contained in the micro model by probabilities of the corresponding 
events in the macro mode 1 permi ts the separ at i on of the re 1 i abi 1 i ty mode 1 
into a coverage model, which must be solved only once, and a reliability 
program which uses the coverage model output (see Section 2.3). 
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THIS PROJECT 
The objectives of this project are the verification of the mathematical 
model and the computer code (Task 1) and the test stressing (Task 2) of 
CARE-III. This interim report addresses the results to date on Task 1. 
Additional Task 1 results, and all Task 2 findings will be addressed in 
the final report. 
Task 1 
In the mathematical model verification, equations are to be independently 
derived from the basic model. The solution approach implemented is to be 
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investigated with respect to accuracy and stability. Approxirriations used 
in the simplification of the model and the solution approach are to be 
reviewed and evaluated. 
In the computer code verification the program structure, algorithms and 
equations are to be reviewed. In the program structure review modularity, 
maintainability, internal structure logic and data storage are to be eval-
uated. The choice and implementation of algorithms, for numerical solving 
or evaluating equations, are to be reviewed. Equations derived from the 
code are compared to those from the mathematical model. 
This verification process is intended to assure that CARE-III is a mathe-
matically valid reliability tool for a well defined set of problems. 
1.4 QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED 
During this investigation of CARE-III, a number of questions have arisen. 
Many of these have been resolved and are addressed in this interim report. 
• Documentation - The original theory document, Phase II, for CARE-
III was inadequate for describing the model and program. This 
interim report is intended to fill some of that void. 
• Mathematical Model 
- The detailed stochastic model for the system represented 
- The simplified stochastic model approximating the detailed 
model 
- The derivation of transiti on rates 
- The solution approach (differential equation versus integral 
equation versus approximate integral equation solutions) 
- Coverage 
- Transient failure model 
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• Model Implemented in Code 
- Program architecture 
- Algorithms chosen 
- Approximations in solution implementation 
- Program efficiency 
- Rel i abil ity 
- System architecture for computing Q and P* 
- Sparing algorithm 
• Representation of FTFCS - A user's guide is needed which shows how 
the user may go from an understanding of a system (system struc-
ture, error rates, detection isolation and reconfiguration rates) 
to representing the system in CARE-III. 
- What systems may be represented by CARE-III? 
- How is software failure modeled? 
- How are stage and module dependencies handled?" 
1.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
1.5.1 General Comments 
During Task 1, Model Verification, the BCS team has extensively reviewed 
the CARE-III model, the CARE-III documentation and the CARE-III program 
(Versi on 3, 1982). We agree with a vast majority of the materi al eval u-
ated. There are, however, several areas which we feel need either further 
development or reworking. 
The development of the CARE-III program shows an understanding of the 
basic requirements for a reliability program for a FTFCS. The basi c 
structure chosen, a non-homogeneous semi-Markov process, appears to pro-
vide a general structure which permits representing the operation of a 
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FTFCS (e.g., scheduled computations; sparing; majority voters; permanent, 
intermittent and transient faults; fault coverage). Due to the exces-
sively large number of states in this model for any reasonable system, 
implementation is not feasible. Dr. Stiffler replaces this model with a 
much simpler approximation, a non-homogeneous Markov model with a greatly 
reduced number of states. Appropriate assumptions on relative transition 
rates permit the separate solution of the coverage and reliability models. 
The solution of the resultant model is feasible, and is implemented in the 
CARE-III program. The CARE-III code exhibits good program structure and 
organization. Comments within the program highlight the calculations 
performed in the various subroutines. For a reasonably large and complex 
program, over 4500 lines of FORTRAN code, relatively few coding errors 
were identified during the review. 
1.5.2 Documentation 
The incomplete existing documentation for CARE-III poses a major problem 
for anyone interested in investigating or understanding the model and 
using the code. The underlying theoretical model, the solution approach, 
the implementation of the model into code, and the choice of algorithms 
implemented are not well documented in the Raytheon Phase II reports 
(Stiffler, J. J. and Bryant, L. A. (1982); Bryant, L. A. and Stiffler, 
J. J. (1982 a,b)). The intent of this report is to fill some of this 
void. 
For a FTFCS designer, the existing User's Manual, Bryant, L. A. and 
Stiffler, J. J. (1982b), does not provide sufficient guidance in the use 
of CARE-III. The principal problem of representation, transferring system 
design information into input parameters, is not addressed. The meaning 
and use of several input parameters are inadequately described. In order 
to make CARE-III a useful tool, this shortcoming must be remedied. 
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1.5~3 Theoretical Model 
The reliability model which CARE-III implements is an approximation to the 
detailed, but intractible, reliability model which better represents a 
FTFCS. The assumpti ons necessary for, and the 1 imitati ons as a result of 
this approximation are not detailed in the CARE-III documentation. In the 
derivation of rates within the model, we take exception with several of 
the formulas. The b
xy ' as defined in the CARE-III documentation, and as 
implemented in code, lead to some questionable results. These terms, 
necessary for computi ng doubl e-fault coverage probabi 1 iti es, give differ-
ent answers if one numbers modul es from 1 eft to ri ght or ri ght to 1 eft. 
We believe the definition of b
xy needs to be changed and have provided a 
solution (equations 3.4-11 and 3.4-22). 
The transient case appears to pose a problem for CARE-III. The most 
natural way to represent transient faults is through a reversible model. 
That is, transitions from R. to 1. - 1 are possible. An irreversible 
model is, however, much easier to solve. CARE-III, an irreversible model, 
addresses transients by modifying the fault occurrence rate. This 
approach has led to computational problems in the code. We believe that 
these problems can be avoided by calculating the intensity of entry into 
the detected as permanent state instead of its probability. It should be 
noted that the formulas used for transient faults in the derivation of 
rates have not been validated and require further investigation. 
1.5.4 Model Implementation and Code 
The reliability model implemented in CARE-III is defined by a system of 
ordinary differential equations for the probabilities of the system to be 
in operational states (PiS), coverage failure states (Qls) and exhaustion 
failure states (SiS). The differential equations are not solved directly 
by a numerical integration method, but rather the integral solution of the 
equati ons is computed usi ng numeri cal quadrature methods. BCS suggests 
that this decision should be reconsidered. To compute the solution, the 
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piS in the integral equations for Q and S are replaced by the perfect 
coverage probabilities (P*I S), which can be computed directly. The impact 
of this approximation on the estimation of the system reliability is not 
addressed in the CARE-III documentation or monitored in the program. 
The calculation of system reliability is partitioned into JlSUBRUNls Jl which 
consist of the evaluation of the reliability of subsystems which are inde-
pendent in the sense that modules in different subsystems are not criti-
cally coupled. The calculation of system reliability from SUBRUN results 
appears to be in error and is under current investigation. 
1.5.5 Algorithms and Data Structures 
The solution of the CARE-III reliability model requires the implementation 
of algorithms for the numerical integration of a function and the numer-
ical convolution of two functions. The quadrature rule used for numerical 
integration is Simpson's Rule, and it is adequately progranmed in CARE-
llI. However, the stepsize for the integration is proportional to the 
flight time, since the array sizes for the reliability functions are 
fixed. This may degrade the accuracy of the solution for long flight 
times. The method of moments is used for numerical convolution of the 
module failure rate functions with the coverage failure rate functions. 
The implementation is based on the assumption that the coverage failure 
rate functions decay quickly to zero in the time scale of the module 
failure rate functions. BCS questions whether this assumption is valid in 
all cases; the resolution of the question is important because the con-
volution is the vital link between the coverage and reliability models. 
The solution of the CARE-Ill coverage model requires the implementation of 
algorithms for the numerical sum of two functions, the numerical integra-
tion of a function, the numerical convolution of two functions and the 
numerical solution of Volterra integral equations of the second kind. The 
procedure for computing the numerical sum, Simpson's rule for numerical 
integration and the Trapezoidal rule for numerical convolution are ade-
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quately prograrrrned in CARE-III. The procedure for solving Volterra inte-
gral equations is based on linear interpolation and the numerical convolu-
ti on al gorithm. Although the procedure is adequately programmed in CARE-
llI, BCS has questioned its numerical stability; this is a subject of cur-
rent study. 
All the algorithms for the coverage model are closely tied to a CARE-III 
data structure, which permits only doublings of the discrete stepsize. 
Th is is based on the expectation that a 11 cover age funct ions are exponen-
tially decaying, positive functions. The heuristics in the numerical sum, 
convolution and Volterra algorithms indicate that not all coverage func-
tions meet the expectation. More general algorithms and data structures 
may improve the computations in the coverage model. 
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Section 2 
OVERVIEW OF CARE-III MODEL 
The reliability model implemented in CARE-III is designed to assess the 
reliability of complex, redundant, fault-tolerant systems such as FTFCS's; 
requirements for the model are briefly discussed in Section 2.1. As 
pointed out in Section 2.2, the detailed model used in CARE-III requires 
the solution of a semi-Markov process with an excessively large number of 
states. An aggregation procedure, discussed in Section 2.3, is used in 
CARE-III to reduce the solution task to the solution of an aggregate 
reliability model and a coverage model. 
The aggregate reliability model is briefly reviewed in Section 2.4 below 
and is then discussed in detail in Section 3; the theory and derivation of 
the model is given in Sections 3.1 to 3.4 and its implementation in CARE-
III is described in Sections 3.5 to 3.6. The coverage model is briefly 
reviewed in Section 2.5 below and is then discussed in detail in Section 
4; the theory and derivation of the model is given in Sections 4.1 to 4.2 
and its implementation in CARE-III is described in Sections 4.3 to 4.4. 
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2.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR MODELING FTFCS's 
In Phase I of the research conducted by the Raytheon Company, several 
FTFCS's were studied to determine requirements for the CARE-III 
reliability model; these included SIFT, FTMP, ARCS and FTSC. The require-
ments established by the Raytheon researchers, J. J. Stiffler, L. A. 
Bryant, L. Guccione (1979) pp. 12-16, are quoted below: 
• "Capability of modeling up to at least 40 stages" 
• "Multiple operating modes for each set of coupled stages" 
• "Separate coverage model similar to that in CARE-II but capable of 
handling latent and intermittent faults as well as permanent 
faults" 
• "Multiple success criteria" 
• "N-point failure mechanisms" 
• "Time-dependent hazard rates" 
• "Transient faults" 
• "Non-unity dormancy factors" 
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2.2 FORMULATION OF CARE-III MODEL 
In the usual reliability analysis of a system, the system is operational 
if at least a specified set of modules is operational. . In a FTFCS, the 
system is operational if at le~st a specified set of modules is opera-
tional, and the faulty modules have not caused a faulty operation of the 
sys tem before they are detected, i so 1 ated, and replaced. The mask i ng of 
the faulty operation of a module before it is replaced is called fault 
coverage and is part of the fault tolerance of the system. For a FTFCS 
the reliability of the system is the probability that at least a specified 
set of modules is operational and that all faulty modules have been cover-
ed. 
2.2.1 Modules and Stages 
The basi c units represented in CARE-II I are modules (e.g., processor, 
memory, bus); groups of identical modules are called stages. A stage is 
operational if at least a specified number of modules in that stage are 
operational. 
For stage x, define 
n(x) = number of stage x modules, 
m(x) = minimum number of x modules necessary for stage operation, 
i(x) = number of failed stage x modules. 
Then, assuming perfect coverage and independence of modules, the 
probability of stage x being operational is a sum of binomial probabili-
ties (see Section 3.5.4). 
2.2.2 Exhaustion 
The system is composed of N independent stages. Assuming perfect 
coverage, the system is in either an operational or a failed state based 
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on the state of each of the N stages and the system logic. Module status 
is used only in determining the state of the stage. 
System failure caused by stage failure(s) is termed failure by exhaustion. 
This is best illustrated by example. Consider a system composed of two 
stages, x and y. This system is in an operational state if either x or y 
are operational. Then the reliability R of the" system, using the 
independence of stages, is 
R = P (system is operational) 
= 1 P (system failed) 
= 1 P (stage x failed and stage y failed) 
= 1 P (stage x failed) • P (stage y failed) 
2.2.3 Coverage 
For a FTFCS, the operational status of the stages, together with system 
architecture is insufficient to determine if the system is operational. 
The status of each failed module must be known, together with some system 
logic, to determine whether a failed module, or a pair of failed modules, 
have caused propagation of an error and system failure before the failed 
modules are detected, isolated, and replaced by spare modules. System 
failure due to improper error masking is termed a coverage failure. 
In the ultra-reliable FTFCS imagined for future aircraft, coverage failure 
is presumed to be the dominant mode of failure. To address this failure 
mode a detailed model is necessary to carry the relevant information on 
the status of the failed modules. 
A common fault tolerant technique to mask errors is to use triplexes with 
majority voting. Three identical modules perform the same task. If a 
single module is faulty, the voter should mask the error. Failure of the 
voter to mask the error to the system is a single fault coverage (system) 
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failure. If two modules in the triplex are faulty, the majority voter 
can't mask the error. These modules are said to be critically coupled. 
There may be spare stage modules available, but the existence of two 
faulty modules in the triplex brings the system down before the faulty 
modules may be replaced. This is a double fault coverage (system) 
failure. 
The coverage problem for a module is represented by a multi-state semi-
Markov model discussed in Sections 2.5,3.1 and 4.2. The coverage model 
addresses both single and double fault failure. Higher order failure com-
binations are not addressed by CARE III. In a pentaplex system with 
majority, 3-out-of-5, voting critical triples need to be represented. 
2.2.4 Fault Categories 
A module may be susceptible to more than one mode of failure, each mode 
having its own occurrence rate. These competing risks on the module may 
have different coverage parameters. This level of detail is incl uded in 
the CARE-III model and discussed in Sections 2.5, 3.1 and 4.1. 
2.2.5 State Space 
Given the system, stage, and coverage structure, the state of the system 
is determined by the status of the stages and the faulty modules. The 
module information must include which modules have failed, fault category, 
and coverage state. Let (x,a) denote the a-th module in stage x. The 
fault information for (x ,a) is completely specified as below by the vector 
d(x,a), i(x,a), c(x,a), up to sparing. A representation of sparing could 
be accomplished by the inclusion of an additional indicator variable. 
d(x,a) = 
i{x,a) = 
o if (x,a) operational, 
1 if (x,a) faulty, 
Fault category (0 to 5), 
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c{x,a) = Coverage state of module (A, B, ... ). 
Let M denote the number of modules in the system, then 
N 
M = I: n{x), 
x =1' 
and the state of the system is completely specified by the three M dimen-
sional vectors: 
d = (d(l,l), ••• , d(N,n(N)), 
i = (i(l,l), ••• , i(N,n(N)), 
c = (c(l,l), ••• , c(N,n(N)). 
If there are only two stages (N = 2), with three modules per stage (n{l) = 
n(2) = 3), three fault types, and five coverage states, the number of (~, 
.i, ~) states is 
Not all of these states are possible. If d = 0, then i = c = O. This 
reduces the number of states to 
This number can be further reduced, since not all these stages are 
possible; yet the number of states remaining is still huge. Given the 
failure rates for the fault types, the coverage parameters, and the 
system, stage and coverage structure, the stochastic model is fully 
specified. However, sol ving the resulting integral equati ons for state 
probabilities for even this simple system is not feasible. For any system 
of moderate size and complexity, N will be much larger, as will be n(x), 
and the number of states increases exponentially. Some solution approach 
is required which reduces the dimensionality of the problem. 
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2.3 SOLUTION OF CARE-III MODEL 
An approximate solution of the detailed reliability model for CARE-III is 
obtained by solving a reduced order reliability model that is constructed 
by an aggregati on procedure. The states of the system are grouped into 
aggregate states defined by the following system data: 
• Number of faulty modules in each stage, 
• System fault tree, 
• Coverage structure, 
• Critical pairs fault trees. 
Rates for transiti ons between aggregate states are defined as aggregates 
of the rates for transitions between detailed states in the aggregate 
states. Approximate values for these rates are defined by an averaging 
procedure that decomposes the coverage and re 1 i abi n ty ca lcul at ions. The 
resulting reduced order reliability model is still a semi-Markov process; 
however, it is approximately a Markov process under the assumption that: 
• The coverage rates are much greater than the module failure rates. 
The aggregation procedure thus decomposes the sol ution of the detai led 
reliability model into the solution of two problems of lower dimension: 
• Coverage Model; 
semi-Markov-process, and 
• Reliability Model; 
non-homogenous, Markov-process. 
These models are discussed briefly in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 below and then 
in detail in Sections 3.1 - 3.4 and 4.1 - 4.2; the rest of this section 
outlines the construction of the aggregate state space. 
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The aggregate states are indexed by "fault vectors II which specify the 
number of faulty modules in each stage: 
:t. = {L = (I (1). £(2) •••• I (N)) 0 ~ £(x) ~ "(x). 1 ~ x ~ N} 
For a particular fault vector, stage x has failed by spares exhaustion if 
1. (x) > n(x) - m(x); the system has failed by spares. exhaustion if the 
system fault tree specifies that the set of failed stages for...!. is a 
system failure. This decomposes the set of fault vectors into two sets: 
d!.= LuI, 
where the system is operational for fault vectors in L and failed for 
fault vectors in I. 
The aggregate states shown in Figure 2.3-1 are defined as follows: 
• 1. 
• 1. 
e I; 
H(...!.) = { (!! • .!..£) L d(x,a) = l(x). l~X~N}. 
a 
e L; 
GelJ = (s!,i,.£): L d(x,a) = 1. (x), 1 ~ x ~ N , 
a 
and c does not specify any single or double fault 
f ai 1 ures. 
F(JJ = (s!,i,.£): L: d(x,a) = 1.(x), 1~x~N , 
a 
and .£ specifies at least a single or double fault 
fail ure. 
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OPERATIONAL STATES 
FAILURE DUE TO COVERAGE 
Figure 2.3-1 General Structure ·of CARE III Aggregate Model 
FAILURE BY SPARES 
EXHAUSTION 
The criteria for including (i,.i,f) in G(JJ or F(.l..) based on c is 
explained in detail in Sections 3.1.3-4 where the single and double fault 
coverage models are described. 
The possible transitions between the aggregate states are illustrated in 
Figure 2.3-2; -.!. is an arbitrary fault vector and 1. + ]Jy) differs from 
-.!. only in having one more fault in stage-y: 
• Case (a): G(J.J to F(-.!.) 
In case (a), R. eLand the only transition is from G(1J to 
F(JL) due to single fault coverage failure. 
• Case (b): G(..!..) to G(..!.+l(y)) or FCl.+!'(y)) 
In case (b),j- and ~ + l(y) eLand the possible transitions are 
from G(JJ to G(-.!.+l(y)) or from GelJ to FL!.+l(Y)) due to a 
double fault coverage failure. 
• Case (c): G(..!.) to HL!.+l(y)) 
-In case (c), .l.. eLand 1... + l(y) eLand the only transition is 
from G(~) to H(JL+l(Y)) due to system failure by exhaustion. 
• Case (d): H(.l..) to H(1.+1(y)) 
In case (d), JL and..!.. + l(Y) eLand the only transition is from 
H(l.J to H(JL+l(Y)). These transitions are included in the model 
since the H(jl) states are not treated as absorbing states. 
No transitlons fran the F(1.) states are defined in the model since the 
F(jl) states are treated as absorbing states. 
A complete description of the aggregate reliability model is given in 
Section 3.2 and the calculation of the rates for transitions between 
aggregate states is presented in Section 3.4. The discussion illustrates 
how the aggregation procedure decomposes the solution of the high order 
detailed reliability model for CARE-III into the solution of the low order 
coverage and aggregate reliability models. 
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Case (a): 1:. E L 
Case (b): 1, 1 + l(y) E L 
Case (c): 1. E L, 1. + l{Y) E r 
Case (d): 1, 1 + l(y) E [ 
. --
Figure 2.3-2 Transition Between Aggregate ·States 
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2.4 RELIABILITY MODEL 
The reliability of the system at time t, R(t), is given by 
R(t) = P (system in state G(Jl) at time t, Jl e L) 
and is computed by 
R(t) = 1 - P (system in state F(Jl) at t, Jl e L) -
P (system in state H(Jl) at t, Jl e L) 
= 1 - L P(F( 1-) at t) - L_ P(H(JJ at t) 
teL - teL 
= 1 - L Q(tl £) -Le L - L_ S(t11) ie L -
A system fault tree specifies the system structure in terms of the stages. 
These failure paths, together with the vector (n(x) - m(x)), determine the 
sets Land L for which the probabilities Q(t 11:,) and S(t I1:.J must be 
computed (see Sections 2.3 and 3.5.2). 
Consider a system with two stages. Let 
n(l) = n(2) = 3 
m(l) = m(2) = 2 
Then each stage may experience a single fault and still operate. If the 
stages are in series, as described by the system fault tree, the 1 (1), 
1 (2) space is partitioned with respect to Q and S computation as shown in 
Figure 2.4-1. 
If the stages are in parallel, the i(l), 1(2) space is partitioned as 
shown in Figure 2.4-2. 
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.£(2) 
0 1 2 3 
, 
0 Q Q 5 5 
1 Q Q 5 5 
- - - - - -
t (1) 2 5 5 5 5 
3 5 5 5 5 
Figure 2.4-1 JL space partition for series system 
.£(2) 
0 1 2 3 
0 Q Q Q Q 
1(1) 1 Q Q Q Q 
2 Q Q ·5 5 
I 
3 Q Q I 5 5 
I 
Figure 2.4-2 1. space partition for parallel system 
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To obtain S(tli) and Q(tl_1J one must solve the integral equations since 
the process is semi-Markov. The approximation of this process by a Markov 
process, as discussed in Sections 2.3 and 3.2.4 permits one to obtain 
S(tl..lJ and Q(tl_1J from the differential equations (3.2-1 to 3.2-6). 
Solution of these differential equations by direct numerical integration 
was rejected by the CARE-III developers after considering a simple 
difference equation. (Other numerical integration procedures are 
available and should be considered.) The differential equations are 
solved in CARE-III by using numerical quadrature methods to evaluate the 
formal integral solution of the equations. 
CARE-III does not solve the differential equations for the S(tl~). Under 
the assumption that the coverage transition rates are much larger than the 
failure rates, perfect coverage probabilities P*(tl~) are solved for 
(equation 3.3-1), where P*(tl_1J is just the product of the N binomial 
probabilities for stage x to have I.(x) failures (3.3-2). The assumption 
of relative rates suggests that the p*(t IJJ should approximate S(tl_2) 
and errs on the conservative side, overestimating failure probabilities. 
In the forward integral equations for Q(tl_1J, P(tl_L) is replaced by 
p*(tl_1J to yield an approximate solution for Q(tl_1J (equation 3.3-4). 
This again errs on the conservative side, overestimating Q(tl...,L). Thus 
the reliability R(t) is underestimated. The error in these approximations 
for extremely small probabilities is under current investigation. 
2.5 COVERAGE MODEL 
Each module may be subject to several failure modes, each with a different 
rate of occurrence. The coverage model represents probabil istically the 
fault tolerance part of the system. Different types of faults may have 
different probabilities of occurrence and different probabilistic coverage 
models. 
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Modules are classified as either fault-free or faulty (Figure 2.5-1). 
Modules are also classified as being either in-use, spare or isolated. A 
module has a latent failure if the module is faulty and in-use or spare. 
The coverage model addresses the ability of the system to survive latent 
in-use failures, the object of the fault tolerance of the system. 
There are nine states in the coverage model for a single module, as shown 
in Figure 2.5-2. The states are: 
A (active) 
AE (active error) 
B (benign) 
BE (benign error) 
F (fai 1 ed) 
AO (active detected) 
BO (benign detected) 
- module capable of producing an error 
- module producing error(s) 
- modu 1 e has not produced errors and is 
currently not faulty 
- module has produced error(s) but is 
currently not faulty 
- module has caused system failure 
- module in active state has been detect-
ed as faulty 
- module in benign state has been detect-
ed as faulty 
OP (detected as permanent) - module has been detected as having a 
permanent or intermittent fault and has 
been isolated from the system. 
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FAULT-FREE FAULTY 
Not 
Possible 
Module Classes 
Fault-free 
Faul ty 
In-use 
Spare 
Isolated 
IIJlfifillil1 IN-USE 
SPARES 
ISOLATED 
have not experienced a fault 
have experienced a fault 
active part of system 
ready for, but not currently a part of active 
system 
deleted permanently from the active system. 
F'igure 2.5-1 Module Classification 
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I , 
A: ACTIVE 
B: BENIGN 
D: DETECTED 
E: ERROR 
F: FAILURE 
/ 
, 
/ 
'" / 
, 
, 
, 
DP: DETECTED AS PERMANENT (NON-TRANSIENT) 
Figure 2.5-2 Single Fault Coverage. Model 
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Three basic fault types are represented by the coverage model: permanent, 
intermittent and transient faults. A permanent fault, Figure 2.5-3, re-
mains faulty and is either eventually detected and isolated (DP) or causes 
system failure (F), the only absorbing states. An intermittent fault, as 
shown by Figure 2.5-2, oscillates between the active and benign states (A 
and B or AE and BE) before it is isolated (DP) or causes system failure 
(F). A transient fault, Figure 2.5-4, is a temporary fault for a module. 
The module may cause system failure (F), be incorrectly identified as a 
permanent failure and isolated (DP), or become error free (B). 
Two types of coverage failures are represented in CARE-III. A single 
fault coverage failure occurs when a faulty module propagates an error be-
fore the module is detected and isolated. A double fault coverage failure 
occurs when a pair of in-use modules with latent faults exist which to-
gether cause system failure. The double fault coverage model may be look-
ed at as a combination of two single fault coverage models. Of the 
9X9 = 81 potential states, various combinations of single fault non-
failure states are double fault system failure states (AA, ABE and AEB). 
Some combinations are not possible, while others revert to the single 
fault coverage model. 
When specifying fault modes for a stage, the specification of the transi-
ti on rates between the coverage states defi nes the faul t type. The 
critically coupled modules, within or between stages, which may cause a 
double fault failure are user specified by a critical pairs fault-tree. 
The single and double fault models are discussed in Sections 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4. Derivation of the coverage rates for the reliability equations are 
given in Section 4. 
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Figure 2.5-3. Single Permanent Fault Coverage Model 
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A: ACTIVE 
B: BENIGN 
D: DETECTED 
E: ERROR 
'F: FAILURE 
" / 
/ 
, 
, 
" , 
DP: DETECTED AS PERMANENT 
-------
Figure 2.5-4 Single Transien~ Fault Coverage Model 
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Section 3 
RELIABILITY MODEL 
The theory and implementation of the CARE-III reliability model is 
described in this section. The mathematical details of the reliability 
mode 1 have been extracted from the CARE- II I documentat i on, J. J. 
Stiffler, L.A. Bryant and L. Guccione (1979), J. J. Stiffler, and L. A. 
Bryant (1982), J. J. Stiffler, J. S. Neumann and L. A. Bryant (1982) and 
the CARE-III program (Version-3, 1982). In those areas where the documen-
tation is vague or incomplete, BCS has completed the model specifications 
based on its understanding of the applicable reliability methods. 
Section 3.1 presents a specification of the detailed CARE-III reliability 
model including the concepts of spares exhaustion, and single or double 
fault failures; the model is characterized by a detailed state space 
model. The solution of the CARE-III model is described in Sections 3.2 to 
3.4; first the aggregation procedure used to reduce the order of the reli-
ability model is presented in Section 3.2, then the solution procedure 
used to solve the model is given in Section 3.3, and finally, the calcula-
tion of the transition rates for the model is described in Section 3.4. 
The implementation of the CARE-III model is described in Sections 3.5 to 
3.6; first an overview of the CARE3 program is presented in Section 3.5, 
and then the computational methods used in CARE3 are highlighted in 
Section 3.6. 
Any discr~pencies between the CARE-III documentation or the CARE3 program 
and the reliability model, as found by BCS during the Task 1 review, are 
pointed out in the discussion in Section 3. 
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3.1 DETAILED RELIABILITY MODEL 
3.1.1 Model Specifications 
The objecti·ve of the model is to calculate the reliability of a complex, 
redundant Fault Tolerant System •. Such highly reliable systems can fail 
due to exhaustion of adequate resources, but the dominant cause of failure 
tends to be failure to detect and isolate malfunctioning elements -
coverage failures. 
The system modeled by CARE III consists of a number of stages (up to 70), 
and each of these is composed of one or more identical interchangeable 
modules. 
Recall the notation introduced in Section 2.2 where for stage-x, 
(x,a) = 
n(x) = 
m(x) = 
a-th module in stage-x, 
number of modules in stage-x, 
minimum number of modules necessary for stage-x to be oper-
ational. 
Furthermore, for each stage-x, the vector NOP(x) indicates the number of 
modules in-use as a function of the number of latent and fault free 
modules. NOP(x) is a vector of integers (q(1,x), q(2,x), ••• ) with n(x) ~ 
q{i,x) > q{i+1,x) ~ m(x). If s modules have been deleted, and q{i-1,x) 
> n{x) - s ::t q{i,x) (q{o,x) = n(x)+1), then q{i,x) modules are in-use, 
and n(x) - s - q{i,x) modules are treated as operational spares. 
Figure 2.5-1 shows the relationships between faulty, latent, in-use and 
spare modules. 
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In the present model each stage-x module can suffer from one of several. 
categories of faults (up to' 5). The j-th fault category for a stage-x 
module is denoted by Xj and is defined by its rate of occurrence, 
w{x.)-l 
A(t I x.) = A(X.) w(xJ.)t J J J 
and the fault coverage parameters (which characterizes whether the fault 
is permanent, intermittent or transient, its detection and isolation 
schedules, etc.). 
A permanent or intermittent fault is said to be latent from the time it 
fi rst occurs until it is detected and i so 1 ated from the system. A tran-
sient fault is said to be latent from the time it first occurs until it is 
either detected and isolated or reaches a benign state. 
As discussed in Section 2.2 there are several causes of coverage failure: 
Single Fault Failure 
Cl. An existing latent fault causes the system to take some unacceptable 
action, 
Double Fault Failures 
C2. A new fault occurs which, in combination with an existing latent 
fault, prevents the system from functioning properly; 
C3. A pair of existing latent faults for the first time reaches a system-
disabling state. 
The analysis of the first cause of coverage failure and of the latency 
period of a fault is based on the Single Fault Coverage Model described in 
Section 3.1.3. 
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The last two causes of failure are analyzed in Section 3.1.4 and are ap-
plicable only for the case of interacting modules, i.e., critical pairs of 
modules. The set of such pairs denoted by CP depends on the architecture 
of the system and is defined by a Critical Pairs Fault Tree. 
3.1.2 Spares Exhaustion Failure 
The state of the system is represented by the vector .1... = (£ (1), 
1(2), ••• , l(x), ••• ), where .l(x) indicates the number of stage-x modules 
that have experienced a fault. Each stage-x is said to have failed (due 
to spares exhaustion) if the number of operational modules falls below the 
allowed minimum, i.e., n(x) - £(x) is less than m(x). System failure due 
to exhaustion of spares is then defined by a combination of stage failures 
introduced by a System Fault Tree. The set of spares exhaustion states is 
denoted by L 
3.1.3 Single Fault Coverage Failure 
The Single Fault Coverage Model, SFCM, defines the coverage structure and 
helps analyze the latency period of a fault. The SFCM is shown in Figure 
3.1-1, and its dynamics are described in what follows. 
When a fault first occurs, it is said to be in the active state A (see 
Figure 3.1-1). If the fault is transient or intermittent, it may jump 
from the active to the benign state B. These transitions take place at a 
constant rate or; for permanent faults, or= O. If the fault is intermit-
tent, the reverse, benign-to-active, transition takes place at some con-
stant rate fJ ; for transi ent faults, or., 0 and fJ = O. In the beni gn 
state, the fault is incapable· of causing any discernable malfunction. 
Thus, it can neither be detected nor can it produce erroneous output. In 
the active state, however, the fault is both detectable and capable of 
produc i ng incorrect output. The rates at whi ch either of these events 
take place depend upon the operating environment and, in particular, on 
how frequently and how often the faulty element is exercised in a way that 
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1-PB , CE(T) 
A: ACTIVE 
B: BENIGN 
D: DETECTED 
E: ERROR 
F: FAILURE 
DP: DETECTED AS PERMANENT (NON-TRANSIENT) 
Figure 3.1-1 Single Fault Coverage Model 
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causes the defect to manifest itself. If the fault is detected the system 
enters the active-detected state AD, and if it produces an error it enters 
the active-error state AE• These transitions occur at time t, as measured 
from 1 ast entry into state A, according to the probabi 1 ity density func-
tions d (t) and p (t) respectively. Once the system is in the active-
error state AE' if the fault is either intermittent or transient, it may 
jump to the benign state. The error is still present so the state is 
designated the benign-error state BE. The composition of the two error 
states, AE and BE' is denoted the error state E. When the faulty element 
is in the error state, it jumps t time units after entry into AE' and 
according to probability density function e (t), to some point in the 
system. At this point the error is either detected or else propagates 
resulting in system failure, i.e., enters state F (coverage failure Cl). 
The probabilities of these two alternatives are C and l-C, respectively. 
If the fault is detected, either through testing or through the detection 
of an erroneous output, the faulty element enters the active-detected 
state AD or benign-detected state BO' depending on the state of the fault 
when it was detected. At that time a decision is made as to whether the 
faulty element is to be retired from the system or whether it can continue 
to be used. This latter decision might be made, for example, if the fault 
recovery procedure included a diagnostic routine designed to distinguish 
between permanent and transient faults. If the fault is detected in the 
active state, the decision is made with probability PA that the element 
must be retired from service; if it is detected in the benign state, the 
same decisi on is made with probabil ity PB• In either case the process 
jumps to detected as permanent state OP. Thus, with probabilities I-PA 
and I-PB' respectively, the faulty element is returned to service 
following the detection of the fault. (The dashed lines in Figure 3.1-1 
indicate that the transition takes place immediately with the probability 
indicated. ) 
The model assumes that the effect of a decision that the fault is 
transient is to eliminate the error, if an error had already been produc-
ed, and to return the faulty element to the error-free, active or benign 
state, depending on its state when the fault was detected. If the fault 
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was transient and detected in the benign state, it returns to the error-
free benign state. Since fJ = 0, it can never again become active so it 
ceases to pose any further threat to the system. If the fault is 
transient and detected as transient in the active state, it remains latent 
and may have another chance to cause system failure. If the fault is 
permanent or intermittent and detected as transient in either detected 
state, AD or BO' it remains latent and may have another chance to cause 
system failure. 
In summary, in the SFCM, 
• the states are: 
A active 
B benign 
AD active detected 
BD benign detected 
AE active error 
BE benign error 
E error (combination of AE and BE) 
DP detected as permanent 
F fail ure 
• the parameters for the transitions are: 
a transition rate from A to B or from AE to BE 
fJ transition rate from B to A or from BE to AE 
(} (t) p.d.f. for transition from A to AD' where t is measured 
from time of last entry into A 
p (t) p.d.f. for transition from A to Ap where t is measured 
from time of last entry into A 
e (t) p.d.f. for transition out of E, where t is measured from 
time of last entry into E 
C probabi 1 ity that a propagated error is detected before 
it causes the system to malfunction 
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probability that a fault detected in the acti ve state is 
detected as permanent 
pr~bability that a fault detected in the beni gn state is 
detected as permanent 
In the present version of CARE III, the functions 6 (t), P (t) and e (t) 
are restricted to be either exponential or uniform densities, i.e., either 
of the form 
8exp(- 8t) , t > 0, 
or 8 , 0 < t < 1/8 , 
for some constant 8. However, the results obtained in Sections 3.2, 3.3, 
3.4 and 4.2 are valid even when these functions are arbitrary densities 
with support on the positive time axis. 
The transitions in this process occur either at constant rates, instanta-
neously or according to some density functions. The parameters that 
govern these transitions are independent of the time at which they occur: 
time homogeneous process. The transitions governed by the densities 
6 (t), p (t) and e (t), are assumed to be independent of past dynamics 
given that time t is measured from the time of last entry into states A or 
E: Markov property at jump times. It follows then that the Single-Fault 
Coverage Model satisfies the conditions of a Semi-Markov process (see 
Appendix A). If all three densities 6 (t), p (t) and e (t) are exponen-
tial, then the SFCM is a Markov process. In Section 4.2 properties of 
such processes are used to calculate the state probabilities and intensi-
ties of entry that are needed to solve the reliability problem. 
3.1.4 Double Fault Coverage Failure 
The dynamics that lead to failures due to interacting modules can be based 
on the corresponding pair of Single Fault Coverage Models, and by de-
termining if, and when, the two independent fault states form some lethal 
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combination. CARE III takes a simplified conservative approach described 
in the following paragraph and summarized in Table 3.1-1. 
When the second module experiences a fault, the first module can be in any 
coverage state. If the first module is either active A or in error E the 
system is assumed to fail immediately (coverage failure C2); if the first 
module created errors that escaped undetected (F) the system has already 
failed and all future analysis is irrelevant; if the first module has been 
deleted from the system (DP) future dynamics of the system are independent 
from it. If the first module is benign B, the system enters the Double-
Fault Coverage Model as described in the following paragraphs. 
Double Fault Coverage Model 
When the first module is in the benign B state the analysis is based on 
the Double Fault Coverage Model, DFCM, which corresponds to a simplified 
version of a combination of the corresponding single models. The DFCM is 
shown in Figure 3.1-2. 
The DFCM is entered according to a rate that depends on the first fault 
being benign and on the rate of occurrence of the second fault. Such a 
situation places the fault-pair in the B1A2 state (first fault benign, 
second fault active.). From there, the fault-pair can go to the B1 B2 
state (both faults benign) if the second fault becomes benign before the 
first fault becomes active, to the state B1D2 if the active fault is 
detected or to the failed state OF (double fault) if the first fault be-
comes active with the second fault still also in the active state or if 
the second fault causes an error to be produced (coverage failure C3). 
From the state B1D2 it can either go to B1DP2 or return to B1A2 depending 
on whether the second is detected as permanent or not. In the state B1DP2 
the second module is deleted from the system. If the first module is 
interacting with some other latent module, it continues to be analyzed 
within the context of the DFCM. If not, it is analyzed in the context of 
the SFCM. 
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Coverage state of 
first module when 
second fault becomes 
active 
A, AE or BE 
F 
DP 
B 
TABLE 3.1-1 
COVERAGE FAILURES FOR CRITICAL PAIRS 
Consequence 
Inmedi ate 
failure 
System already 
fai 1 ed 
First module 
deleted from 
system 
Interaction 
of faults 
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Future 
analysi s 
Independent 
of first 
module 
Enters 
DFCM 
Type of 
coverage 
Failure 
C2 
C1 
Possible C3 
w 
\0 
if critical pair 
Bl , new faul t 
~1 
P2(t) 
SFCM 
SFCM 
AiA2 
BlAE 
2. 
OF 
P1(t) I AE B2 ~--~----~----1-===~ 1 \ A1A2 
(32 
Figure 3.1-2 Double Fault Coverage Model 
Since both faults are benign in the BIB2 state, the only possible transi-
tions from that state are back to the A2Bl state or to the Al B2 state 
(first fault active, second fault benign) with its entirely analogous 
transitions. 
The argument used for the SFCM shows that the Double Fault Coverage Model 
is a Semi-Markov process. 
coverage failures of the 
Section 4.2. 
The intensity entry into state DF characterizes 
third type, C3, and its formula is derived in 
3.1.5 State Space Definition 
The state of the system is determined at each time by the status of each 
module: 
• A fault has occurred or not; 
• Category that caused the fault (if fault occurred); 
-e Coverage fault status (if fault occurred): active, benign, detect-
ed, etc; 
• Spare status of a latent or fault free module. 
Analytically the states are described by the three M-dimensional vectors 
~,i and £, which have been defined in Section 2.2. The information given 
by these vectors corresponds respectively to occurrence of faults, fault 
categories and coverage status. 
Part of the information given by the triple (.!!,i,~J is summarized in the 
vectors 1- = ( 1(1),1(2), ••• , .t(x), .•• ) and l!.. = (#(1), #(2), ••• , #(x), 
••• ) where .t (x) and # (x) denote the numbers of stage-x faulty and 1 atent 
modules, respectively. The triple (~,i,£) gives no information on which 
latent and fault free modules are in-use and which are spare. This in-
formation shall be assumed implicit, and will be used in the classifica-
t i on of states, descri pt i on of trans iti ons and eva 1 uat i on of aggregate 
rates. 
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Classification of States 
The states of the model can be classified according to the failure status 
of the system: 
• The set of spares exhaustion states is denoted by [ and is. defined 
as some combination of unions and/or intersections of sets of the 
form 
I (~,.i,£) / n{x) - l (x) < m{x) I . 
Thi s 1 ast set corresponds to all states for which stage-x has 
fewer than m{x) operational modules (i.e., "failure" of stage-x). 
Such a (~,.i,£) state shall be said to be an H state. 
• L denotes the complement of [. 
A state (~,.i,£) in L, although not defining failure due to spares exhaus-
tion, can represent a case of. coverage fai lure. To isolate such cases 
consider the latent in-use modules determined by (~,.i,£), i.e., non-delet-
ed non-spare faulty modules. Of these consider all possible latent 
critical pairs and all other latent modules (called single modules here-
after). 
The state (~,.i,£) is an F (failure) state if either there is a latent 
single module that created an undetected error (i.e., c-component is F), 
or there is a latent critical pair in state OF, as given in Figure 3.1-2. 
If none of the above conditions are satisfied, the state (~,1,£) is called 
a G (operational) state. 
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3.1.6 Stochastic Characteristics of the Model 
The stochastic model for this state space is characterized by a mixture of 
• Time dependent rates for occurrence of faults; 
• Semi-Markov processes on coverage. dynamics. 
Backward integral equations, similar to those given in the Appendix, could 
be used to calculate the probabilities that the system is in an opera-
tional state. The reliability of the system would then obtained by adding 
all these. 
This approach, though straightforward, has the disadvantage of requiring 
such a large number of calculations that even for moderate size systems 
the problem becomes unmanageable. 
Two steps are taken to obtain a feasible solution. First, states with the 
same number of faults and similar failure characteristics are collected 
into aggregate states, thus reducing the size of the state space. Second, 
detailed information given by the individual states forming an aggregate 
state is replaced by probabilistic statements, thus allowing a decomposi-
tion between the Coverage Models and the Aggregate Reliability Model. The 
Coverage Models are used to derive the transition rates for the Aggregate 
Reliability Model, which, under certain conditions on holding times of the 
original process, is solved as a non-homogeneous Markov process. 
In Section 3.2 the Aggregate Model will be described in detail, excluding 
only the case of transient faults. As mentioned in J. J. Stiffler, J. S. 
Neumann and L. A. Bryant (1982), these cases showed instabilities. A 
model with transient faults would include backward transitions, e.g., from 
JL to JL - !(x) if some transient stage-x fault becomes benign. This step 
is avoided in the present version of CARE III by an approximation based on 
the rel ative speeds of coverage rates and occurrence of fault 
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rates. As an example consider a transient fault as given in Figure 
3.1-3a, i.e., the fault is either detected or becomes benign with constant 
rates f> and a, respectively. The probability of being in state 0 within 
the coverage model is given by 
1 - exp(-( a+f> )t) 
Figure 3.1-3b shows the dynamics of this fault including the occurrence of 
the fault and its possible recurrences. The probability of being in state 
o within the whole system is then given by 
where sl and s2 are the roots of 
If the parameter f> is much larger than ~, then Ho(t) can be approximated 
by 
This last integral corresponds to the value of HO(t) as presently cal-
culated in CARE III. 
The effect of this approach to handling transient faults on the calcula-
tion of transition rates and state probabilities in the Aggregate Model is 
not fully understood. This· problem and the instabi 1 ity encountered by 
Raytheon in Phase III is not addressed in this report. 
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a 
Figure 3.1-3a Example of Transient Fault 
l--------.~Q0~.------~.~ 
Instantaneous 
Transition 
a 
Figure 3.1-3b Dynamics of Transient Fault 
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3.2 REDUCED RELIABILITY MODEL 
3.2.1 Aggregate States 
The reduced state space is formed by aggregation of states with identical 
number of faults per stage and similar failure characteristics. 
As defined in Section 2.3 the possible aggregates for each fault vector 
are: 
If ..1. is in L, 
H(Jl): aggregate of spares exhaustion states with ~ faults; 
and if Jl is in L, 
G(Jl) aggregate of operational states with ~ faults, 
F(jl): aggregate of failure states with ~ faults. 
3.2.2 Transitions and Rates 
As discussed in Section 2.3 the transitions and rates in the Aggregate 
Model are: 
* 
• From H(1.) to HC.L + !(y)) with rate A (tl.,L,i+!(y)), if a faul t 
occurs on a fault free stage-y module; 
• From F(lJ no transitions are possible since these states are 
absorbing; 
• From G(lJ to FC1) with rate J.l (tIJJ if a coverage failure 
occurs; 
• From Gel) 
H(.l..+!(y) ) 
F(-.L+!(y) ) 
to either 
* with rate A (tl..L,.1.+!(y)), 
with rate A (2) (tljl, -l+!(y)), or 
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G(~+!(y)) with rate A (l)(tl~,~+!(y)), 
if a fault occurs on a fault free state-y module. 
To determine under which conditions the different transitions out of G(~) 
occur, it is necessary to disaggregate this state and to analyze the 
dynamics within each of its parts. 
Fix a state (E.,i,EJ in G(l). Such a state divides latent in-use modules 
into two groups: 
• Interacting modules: those latent in-use modules which form a 
critical pair with-another latent in-use module. Such a pair of 
modules will be called~n interacting pair. 
• Single modules: 
interacting. 
those latent in-use modules which are not 
The possible transitions out of the state G(~) are then as follows: 
(1) To F(~) if either 
(l.a) A single module created an error that escaped undetected 
(i.e., transition from E to F i~ corresponding SFCM), or 
(lob) An interacting pair, with one active module and the other 
benign, and either the active module created an error or the 
benign module became active (i.e., transition from AS to OF 
in corresponding DFCM). 
(2) To H(1L+l(y)) if both 
(2.a) A fault occurs on a fault free stage-y module, and 
(2.b) 1..+1{Y) is in L. 
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(3) To F(~+l(Y)) if the following four conditions hold: 
(3.a) A fault occurs on a fault free stage-y module, 
(3.b) ~+l(Y) is in L, 
(3.c) The new faulty module is in-use, and 
(3.d) A latent in-use module, critically paired with the new faulty 
module, and either 
(3.d.I) Is single and non-benign (i.e., active or in 
error), or 
(3.d.2) Is interacting and active. 
(4) To G(~+l(Y)) if the following three conditions hold: 
(4.a) A fault occurs on a fault free stage-y module, 
(4.b) 1 . .+1(Y) is in L, and 
(4.c) Either 
(4.c.I) The new faulty module is not in-use (i.e., it is a 
spare module), or 
(4.c.2) No latent in-use module satisfies condition (3.d). 
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An analysis of the above conditions leads to the following observations: 
• Given that (3.a) holds, condition (4.c) is complementary to the 
set of conditions (3.c) and (3.d), and so 
• The transitions fran Gt.!) to HC.L+!.{y», from Ht.!J to 
H(jl+!.{y», and from ~ to jl+!.(y) under perfect coverage, depend 
on the vector jl of faults but not on the coverage status of the 
system. Thus the rate for all three transitions is given by 
A *(t IL,.l.'+!.(Y» = (n(y)- J. (y» L: 
j 
In the present version of CARE-III, the conditions that define transitions 
from G(jl) to F{jl+!.{y» are replaced by 
(3.a l ) A fault occurs on a fault free stage-y module, 
(3.b l ) JL+!.(y) is in L, 
(3.c l ) The new faulty module is in-use, and 
(3.d l ) A latent in-use and non-benign module is critically paired 
with the new faulty module. 
These new conditions allow for a simpler evaluation of the rates A (2), 
and lead to a conservative value of the reliability of the system. 
3.2.3 Assumptions on Stochastic Properties 
The original stochastic model is a mixture of time dependent rates for 
occurrence of faults and Semi-Markov process for coverage dynamics. 
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The discussion in Section 2.2 on the comparative speed of coverage 
dynamics with that of occurrence of faults suggests that internal 
transitions within aggregate states occur at much faster rates than those 
between such states. Thus the dynamics within these states can be assumed 
to happen instantaneously and the Aggregate Model is well approximated by 
a non-homogeneous Markov process. 
3.2.4 Model Equations and Solutions 
Assuming that the rates for the Aggregate Model are known (their 
derivation is given in Section 3.4), the results given in the Appendix for 
non-homogeneous Markov processes are used to calculate state probabilities 
and the reliability of the system. 
Let the state probabilities be: 
p(tl JJ probabi 1 ity that the system is in state G(.1.) at time t; . 
Q(tl JJ probability that the system is in state F(JL) at time t; 
S(t I 1J probability that the system is in state H(~) at time t. 
These probabilities are conditional on the system being fault free at time 
o. 
The corresponding forward differential equations are then: 
d~ p(tlJJ = -p(tllJ A (tl.1J + L:P(tl.1.-.!.(x» A (1) (tll..-!(x) ,-1.), 
x 
(3.2-1) 
d~ Q(tIL) = P(t 1.1) p (t Ii) + "EP(tl..L-!(x» A (2) (tl.1.-!(x) ,.1), 
x 
(3.2-2) 
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with 
A (tllJ = Jl (tIJ.) + ~ A (tIL,.!..+lJx)} 
x 
~ S(t\l) = -S(t\l) t(t\ i) + dt - - - (3.2-3) 
+ L [P(t IL-l(x» + S(t 11..-1(x» ] A * (t 1.1.-1(x) ,1J, 
x 
with 
* A (t I L) = A (t 11J - Jl (t I.1J . 
The equivalent forward integral equations are: 
I t (1) p(ti-1..) = L: P(ul...L-l(x» A (ul1...-1(x),_lJ exp [-A(u,tllJJ du, x 0 . 
(3.2-4) 
I t Q(t\.lJ = o [P( u 11) I' (ul.1) + :EP(u 11..-1<x)) A( 2) (u 11..-1'<x) ._lJ J du. x 
(3.2-5) 
and 
5(tIL)= it :E~(U IL-1(x) )+5(u IJ... -l(X))JA* (u IL-1(x) •. n ex{ A * (u. t ID}U. 
o x 
(3.2-6) 
* * with A and A denoting the definite integrals of A (.11J and A (.11J 
respectively. 
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The reliability of the system is then 
R{t) = L: p{tl i.), 
i. in L 
or equivalently the unreliability of the system is 
1 - R{t) = L Q{t 1.1) + L: s{ t11J 
i in L .1. in L 
51 
(3.2-7) 
(3.2-8) 
3.3 CARE III SOLUTION 
3.3.1 Perfect Coverage Model 
In Section 3.2 it was seen that the probabilities P(tllJ needed to cal-
culate the reliability of the system are obtained from a system of ordin-
ary differential equations. These can be solved recursively by successive 
increments in the vector L. 
Since, as has been repeatedly observed in this discussion, the systems of 
concern here are highly reliable, A(1)(tl i, l+1(y)) must in general be (2) ---. 
much 1 arger than A (t 11 , 1 +1 (y» and A (t I 1,) must be 1 arge compared (1) - - - - * 
to p(tli). ThusA (tll,l+l(y» is close to A (tli,i+1(y» and 
- * --- ---
A (tllJ is close to A (tllJ. So equation (3.2-1) can be replaced by 
* * * ~ * * ft p (tiL) = -p (tiL) A (til) + LP (tIL-l(x» A (tll..-l(x),.1J. 
X 
(3.3-1) 
* As mentioned in 3.2, the rates A correspond to the perfect coverage case 
* and so P (til..) given in (3.3-1) represents the probability of .l faults 
at time t given perfect coverage. 
Under perfect coverage, the interactions between stages are not relevant 
and so the fault status of stages are independent from each other. It 
follows that 
* (n(x) ) t (x) . n(x)- i (x) 
P (tllJ = IT [l-r(tlx)] [r(tlx)] 
x i(x) 
(3.3-2) 
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where 
r(tlx) =exp[_jt ~A(UIXi)dU]= 
o 1 
(3.3-3) 
= reliability of a stage-x module. 
Formula (3.3-2) can also be obtained directly by solving equation (3.3-1). 
3.3.2 Approximate Reliability 
The approach taken in CARE III is to calculate Q(tll} and S(tl l} by 
* - -
using P (tllJ instead of p(tllJ in equations (3.2-2) and (3.2-3). The 
result of such approximation is to assume that the system has been 
operating under perfect coverage up to time t. This is represented in 
* Figures 3.3-1a and b. Analytically it follows that P (tllJ is larger 
than p(tllJ and so the approximate values of Q(tLl) and S(tllJ are 
larger than those obtained from equations (3.2-2) and (3.2-3). Hence, a 
conservative value of the reliability is obtained. 
The new equation for S(tl £} can be shown to be equivalent to equation 
- * (3.3-1) and so S(tljl} is approximated by P (tIJL). 
The CARE III approach can be summarized by the following steps: 
* 
• calculate P (tIJl) using equation· (3.3-2) 
• calculate Q(t I.l:..J using 
(3.3-4) 
53 
• calculate the unreliability of the system by 
* l-R(t) = I Q(tl.1J + I _P (tl~J (3.3-5) 
i in L L in L 
Perfect 
Perfect 
------..... G(1I)----~. G(!.) 
F(!.) 
Figure 3.3-1a Approximations of State Prob~bilities Q(t!!) 
Assumed Perfect for 
Transition to H-state 
I 
------.. ~G(1) -----.~ .... H(!) 
Figure 3.3-1b Approximations of State Probabilities S{t\1) 
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3.4 TRANSITION RATES 
3.4.1 Approximations Used 
In the original detailed description of the system it is known at each 
time which modules have experienced a fault, the category that caused the 
fault and the coverage status (active, benign, ••• ). Furthermore, it is 
known which of the faulty modules form critical pairs. 
In the reduced model this level of detail has been lost. The rates of 
interest will then be obtained by first calculating the corresponding con-
ditional rates given some detailed faulty structure and then integrating 
with respect to the probability distribution of such structure, i.e., 
r(t) = E [r(t) I ht ], where r(t) is the rate of interest and ht is the 
detailed history of the process to time t. 
In the rest of this section Yt denotes the state of the system at time t. 
So Y t = A denotes the occurrence of event A at time t, and P(Y t = A) the 
corresponding probability. 
Two basic properties are used to derive the aggregate rates: 
P1 If A and B are any two states, where A is the aggregate of 
simpler states Ai' and if r(t), ri(t) denote the rates corres-
ponding to transitions from state A, Ai' respectively, to state 
B, then 
with equality if the states Ai are disjoint. 
P2 Let T1, T2, ••• , Tn be independent and competing transition 
times that occur with rates ri(t).Then the transition rate 
r(t) of the smallest transition time is given by the sum of the 
ri(t). 
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In the derivation of the formulas for the aggregate rates, property PI can 
be used by disaggregating the G(jl) state into its (~,l,£) components and 
considering all the possible choices of in-use (non-spare) modules. Those 
that are possible are not equally likely. Some choices would imply past 
failure of the system, e.g., if (~,l,£) determines a critical pair of 
latent, in-use modules whose OFCM state is OF, this implies past system 
failure. To consider only the truly possible choices of in-use modules, 
given that the system is operational, and how each of these affects the 
aggregate rates, would entail an analysis of the detailed past history of 
the process. Such an approach defeats the purpose of the aggregation and 
decomposition steps taken to decrease the size of the state space. 
The following assumption is thus made: 
(AI) Given.! faults in the system, all choice of spare, in-use 
groups of modules are pOSSible, independently of the fai lure 
status of the system. 
This assumption implies that all states (~,l,£) with the same number of 
latent modules, and the same number of latent, in-use modules, are equally 
likely. Hence, all of these contribute in the same way to the aggregate 
rates. Since this procedure includes more critical pairs than are truly 
possible, over estimates of the aggregate rates are then obtained. 
Condition Al is based on the conservative assumption that the system has 
been operating under perfect coverage until the present. Furthermore, Al 
is consistent both with the approach taken in Section 3.3 to calculate the 
failure state probabilities, Q(tljJ and S(tllJ, and with the 
discussion given in J.J. Stiffler, L.A.· Bryant and L. Guccione (1979, pp. 
32-34) • 
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3.4.2 Calculation of A(2)(t) 
Let A (2) (t 11.,1.. + ]Jy)), or simply A (2) (t), denote the rate of a tran-
sition at time t from state G(lJ to the failure state F(l. + !.(y)). 
Since G(lJ is the aggregate of states of the form (~,.£), using property 
P1 in Section 3.4.1, it follows that 
A (2) (t) = L A (2) (t I d, c) P [V = (d, c) \ V = G (-L )] , 
() -- t -- t -d,c 
where A (2) (t ,~,.£) denotes the rate of a transition from (.Q,'£) to 
Fcl + !.(y)). Such a transition occurs when the first fault free, in-use 
stage-y module, say (y,b), suffers the first possible fault category, say 
Yj; using property P2 it follows that 
A(2)(t) = L~ A(t I Yj) P [Vt = (~,.£), and (y,b) Vt = G(l)] . 
. (d,c) b,J is fault-free, in-use 
As described in Section 3.2.2., a transition to failure state occurs if 
there is a non-benign, in-use module that is critically paired with the 
module (y ,b). 
Again using property P1, by choosing all possible in-use faulty modules 
(x,a) that form a lethal combination with (y,b) and all possible vectors 
j[ of latent modules, gives: 
A(2)(t) s L L ~ L A(tIYj) P [Vt = (.M..,.1J I Vt = G(lJ] Jl (d,c) b,J x,a 
P [V t = (~,.£), and C(a,b) IY t = CM.,..1)] 
where C(a,b) denotes the occurrence of the event: module (x,a) is non-
benign, module (y,b) is fault-free, and both form an in-use critical pair. 
Assumption A1 implies that the status of stages are mutually independent, 
and depend on the number of faults 1.., but not on the failure status of 
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the system. Furthermore, /J. (x) and n(y) - 1 (y) are upper bounds for the 
numbers of latent, in-use stage-x modules, and of fault-free, in-use, 
stage-y modules, respectively. It follows then that: 
"\(2) (t)~ "" ~ "" A [ ] Hii(t I x) 
1\ ~ L.J ~ L.J (t I Yj) /J.(x) n(y) - 1 (y) HL(t I x) 
/J.(x)/J.(y) J a 
where 
probabil i ty that a given stage-x modul e has a 
non-benign fault at time t; 
probabi 1 i ty that a gi ven stage-x modul e has a 
latent fault at time t; 
probability that a given pair of (x,y) modules 
is critical when chosen from existing latent in-
use stage-x modules, and fault-free in-use 
stage-y modules, given l:! latent and 1- faulty 
modules. 
The H functions are evaluated by conditioning on the time of occurrence of 
the xi fault. The b~:~ function ;s evaluated by conditioning on the 
number of latent in-use modules in stages x and y. 
In summary, the rate for a transition from G(jl) to F(jl + !(y)) is given 
by 
){21(t 11...1. + l(yll = [t=X(t 1 Yjl] (n(YI - l(y)) c(t 1 Y. 1 I. (3.4-11 
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with 
c{t Iy,jl) = ~ D{t, (x,y) I JJ, (3.4-2) 
x 
D{t,{x,y)IJl) is defined by (3.4-3) 
L P{X)b~2!{JL'.1J P [Jl{X), t I I{X)] P [Jl{y), t II (y)] if x ~ y 
p{x), p{y) . , 
~ P{Y)b~2~C"_,lJ P [Jl{Y), t I/{Y)] if x = Y, p{y) , 
Hs{tlx) = ~Hi3{tlxi ), (3.4-4) 
i 
Hi3{tlxi ) = !at Atu I Xi) r(ul x) Pjj(t - u I xl) du, (3.4-5) 
HL{tlx) = 4:HL (t Ixi ), (3.4-6) 
1 
HL{tlxi ) = !at A(u I Xi) r(u I x) PL(t - u I xi) du (3.4-7) 
where Ps and PL are both obtained from the Single Fault Coverage Model for 
fault category xi' 
P(p(x),tl/(x)) = ~:;)[a(tlx)] p(x) [l-a(tlx~ t(X)-P(X), (3.4-8) 
a(tlx) = HL{tlx);il - r(tlx) , (3.4-9) 
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r(t\x) = exp [- ff>' (u I xi) dU] . ( 3.4-10) 
(3.4-11 ) 
(
JL ~ x )) In ( x) - .q x )) 
1 _ , q(X)-l _ 
i (
n(x)- l(x)+ JL(X)) (n(y)- t(y)+ JL(Y) a(x,y)) 
q(x) 
i 
· L (_1)j-1 N (q(x), q(y) ! j) [1+8 (x,y) 8 (j,1)] 
j=1 
• (q(X)-j.- ~(x.) 
. 1-J 
N (q(X),q(y) I j) = number of sets of j critical pairs that couple a 
fixed y module, among first q(y) modules, with j 
distinct stage-x modules, among first q(x), 
(3.4-12) 
q(x) = q(i,x) if NOP(x) = (q(1,x), q(2,x), ••• ) and 
q(i-1,x) > n(x) - 1 (x) + JL(x) ~ q(i ,x). 
(3.4-13) 
(Note: b(2) (JL, 1 ) is not implemented in CARE III, Version 3. x,y --
3.4.3 Calculation of JL (t) 
let (t !-.L) denote the rate of a transition at time t from state G(l) 
to state F(-.!.). As described in Section 3.2.2, two types of changes con-
tribute to such a transition: 
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(i) a single latent in-use module in error state E propagates with-
out detection (i.e., transition into state F in the correspond-
ing SFCM); or 
(ii) a latent in-use critical pair in state AB moves to OF in the 
corresponding OFCM. 
I I 
Let a (t 11J and A (t 1.1) denote respectively the ensemble rates due to 
each of the two types of changes. It follows then that their sum is an 
upper bound for the rate p.(t I 1. ). 
I 
Using properties PI and P2 in Section 3.4.1, it follows that a (t 11J is 
given by the expression 
L L La'(t\x,a) p[Vt =~; (x ,a) in-use latent' Vt =G(lJ], d x a 
I 
where a (t I (x,a» is the rate of a transition G(lJ to F(1.) due to error 
propagation in module (x,a). 
By conditioning on the category that caused the fault on module (x,a), and 
on the time of occurrence of the fault one obtains that: 
where HL (t I x) is as defined in Section 3.4.2, and hF(t I xi) is the rate 
. of error propagation failure due to a category Xi fault. 
Since 
~ ~P [Yt .~; (x,a) Single, in-use, latent I Yt = G(!)] 
.;;; E [number of stage-x latent modules I Yt = GC!J] = l(x)a(t I x), 
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where a(t I x) is defined in Section 3.4.2. 
It follows that 
"" hF(tlxi ) 
a (t I 1J ~ L.J L.J l(x) ----
xiI - r(t I x) 
where hF(t I xi) is evaluated by conditioning on the time of occurrence of 
the xi fault. 
I 
Similar steps are taken to evaluate A (t I .. !J. First consider all d 
states that form the aggregate state G(Jl). Then for each state d 
consider all latent critical pairs of faults (Xi'Yj) that can lead to 
failure of the system. Finally condition on both the time of occurrence 
of first fault, and on time of occurrence of the second given that at that 
instant the first fault is benign. These steps lead to the following 
mathematical expression: 
where 
B(t,(x,y)1 t) 
B(t, (x,y)1 i...), 
as defined in Section 3.4.2., 
rate at which an (xi,Yj ) critical pair causes 
system failure, 
expected number of times a given (x,y) pair is 
latent, in-use and critical at time t, given 1 
faults. 
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As was the case for A(2)(t), the evaluation of B(t,(x,y) 11J requires 
detailed analysis of the state space. Use of assumption Al then leads to 
the est imate: 
B(t,(x,y) I~) 
where 
probability that a given (x,y) pair is critical 
when chosen from existing latent, in-use stage-x 
and stage-y modules, given ~ latent and JL faulty 
modules. 
The functions hF, HB and HL are evaluated by conditioning on the time of 
occurrence of the xi fault. The function hOF is evaluated by conditioning 
on the time of occurrence of the Yj fault given that the first fault is 
benign. The function b(1) is obtained by conditioning on the number of 
x,y 
latent in-use modules in stages x and y. 
In summary, the rate for a transition from G{~) into F(~) is given by 
",(t It) = 
I 
a (t I _!J + A (t I JL), (3.4-14) 
where 
I L hF(t I xi) a (t 11...) = i(x) 
l-r{t I x) , x, i (3.4-15) 
= I: I: 
x,i y,j 
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hF(t I xi) = it A(U I Xi) r(u I x1) PF(t-u I xi)du, (3.4-15) 
dt\x) = exp [-f~A(uIX1)dU]' (3.4-16) 
hOF(t \ XiYj) = L\8(U I Xi)A(U I Yj) r(u I y) POF(t-u \ XiYj)dU, ( 3.4-17) 
= (t X(u I x.) r(u I x) PB(t-u I x.) du, Jo 1 1 (3.4-18) 
= ~ (t X(ul x.) r(u I x) PL (t-u.1 x.) du, i Jo 1 1 (3.4-19) 
B(t,(x,Y)I~) as defined by (3.4-20) 
~ (1) . ~ b
x 
yCJ!:..'-.!..) p,(x) p,(y) p( ",(x), t .11. (x» P( JL(Y), t II. (y) if x -I y 
p,(x) , 
p,(y) 
~ (1) .~ by yCE:_,.!J p,(y) (p,(y) - 1) P( JL(y),t Il(y» if x = y, 
p,(y) , 
aCt I x) = HL(t I x)/I - ret I x), (3.4-22) 
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N(q(x),q(y)ll) 
q(x)q(y) 
2N (q (y)-, q (y) 11 ) 
q(y)( q(y)-I) 
( n(x)- leX)) 1 1 _ q( x) 
(n (x) - 1 (x) + JL (X») J q(x) 
1 -
(3.4-22) 
~n(y)- ley») q(y) 
------
(n(y)- 1. (y)+ JL(Y)\ q(y) , 
if x f Y 
if x = y, 
N(q(x),q(y)\l» = number of (x,y) critical pairs among first q(x) 
and q(y) modules, (3.4-23) 
q(x) = q(i,x) if NOP(x) = (q(l,x), q(2,x), •••. ) 
and q (i -1, x) > n (x) - I (x) + JL (x) ~ q (i ,x) • 
(3.4-24) 
(Note: b(1) (u, 1.) is not implemented in CARE III, Version 3). 
X,y --
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3.5 IMPLEMENTATION IN CARE-III 
In the previous sections the formulation of the reliability model was re-
viewed. The objective of this section is to document the model that is 
actually implemented and outline the calculations performed. I~ the 
following sections, the overall structure and data flow of the CARE3 
program are described in some detail, the solution of the reliability 
model is outlined and the basic reliability functions are defined. 
3.5.1 Overview of CARE3 Program 
Figure 3.5-1 illustrates the overall data flow for the CARE3 program. The 
user's input data for the reliability model is read from file CREIN by the 
input program CAREIN. It includes stage data (parameters N, M, NOP, LC), 
fault category data for each stage (parameters type, W, A ), the system 
fault tree and any critical pairs fault trees. After the data is checked 
and preprocessed by CAREIN, it is passed to CARE3 on fil es RELIN, FT15F 
and BXYIN. The moments of the coverage functions are also passed to CARE3 
on file CVGMTS. The reliability model is solved by CARE3 and the 
functions P;UM and QSUM are computed. In addition the reliability 
functions are passed to the plotting program, RELPLT, on file PLTFL. 
Figure 3.5-2 provides a high level functional description of the CARE3 
program; a brief explanation of the functions follows: 
• Computation Control 
These subroutines control the computations for solving the reli-
ability model; the details of the computational sequence are given 
in Section 3.5.2 to 3.5.5. Figures 3.5-3, -4 and -5 illustrate 
the control structure of subroutines CARE3, RLSBRN, NFLTVDP and 
GNFLTVC with call trees. 
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• Reliability Functions 
The subroutines in this group compute the basic reliability 
functions used in the solution of the reliability model; 
definitions of the functions are given in Section 3.5.5. 
o Numerical Integration 
The subroutines in this group are used to compute numerically the 
integral (over a time interval) of a function. This kind of cal-
cUlation is required in the solution of the integral equation for 
the functions Q(tll). The numerical methods used in these sub-
routines are discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
• Numerical Convolution 
The subroutines in this group are used to compute numerically the 
convolution of two functions. This kind of calculation is re-
quired to compute the (time dependent) transition rates of the re-
liability model for the situation of non-perfect coverage. These 
are the most crucial numerical subroutines because they are part 
of the interface between the coverage and reliability models; the 
numerical methods used are discussed in detail in Section 3.6. 
• Support Functions 
These are "library" type subroutines which are used by all other 
subroutines in the program for very basic operations or calcula-
tions. 
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FIGURE 3.5-1 Data Flow for CARE3 Program 
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NFlTVDP 
FIGURE 3.5-4 
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3.5.2 System Fault Tree 
The preprocessing of the system fault tree is performed by the input pro-
gram CAREIN. Figure 3.5-6 illustrates the user's input data for the 
system fault tree (on file CREIN) and the corresponding input for FTREE 
generated by CAREIN. (Refer to the CARE-III User's Manual for a 
descripti on of the input data formats.) A bri ef description of each of 
the parameters in Figure 3.5-6 follows. 
• TITLE: 
• IROP: 
• MCOMB: 
One or more lines of descriptive text. 
FTREE run option; set to 3 by CAREIN. 
The maximum number of input gate (stage) failures; set 
to the maximum of 4 and KWT by CAREIN, where KWT is de-
scribed in the text below. 
• PSTRNC: Perfect coverage truncation value; set to 10-14 by 
CAREIN. 
• IFSTG: The number of the first input gate (stage); it must be 
set to 1 by the user. 
• ILSTG: The m.mber of the last input gate (stage); it must be 
set to NSTGES by the user. 
• IFGTE: The m.mber of the first logic gate in the system fault 
tree. 
• ILGTE: 
• FTHRS: 
The mJ1lber of the last logic gate in the system fault 
tree. 
The flight time (i nhours); computed by CAREIN from the 
.input variable FT in NAMELIST/RNTIME/. 
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• ISTG: The number of an input gate (stage); CAREIN generates an 
input gate for each stage, i.e., ISTG ranges from 1 to 
NSTGES. 
• EFCTLM: The failure rate of an input gate (stage); the CAREIN 
estimate of the failure rate for a stage is described in 
the text below. 
• I1: 
• IGTE: 
• ITYP: 
FTREE control code set to 1 by CAREIN: this forces FTREE 
to consider EFCTLM the failure rate and FTHRS the time 
used to compute the probability of failure for the input 
gate (stage). 
The number of a logic gate in the system fault tree. 
The type of a logic gate; refer to the CARE-III User's 
Manual for a description of the logic gate types. 
• INPUTS: A string of gate numbers listing the inputs to the logic 
gate. 
Figure 3.5-7 illustrates the output data (MINTRM) fi le generated on unit 
FT15F when the system fault tree is processed by FTREE. A brief descrip-
tion of each of the parameters in Figure 3.5-7 follows. 
• PRBMT: The FTREE estimate of the probabil ity of failure of the 
system (after a fl ight time of FTHR) due to the set of 
stage failures indicated by the corresponding MINTRM. 
• MINTRM: A fault vector (1 = failed, 0 = not-failed) for a 
failed state of the system; each fault vector has NSTGES 
components (i.e.~ one for each stage). 
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DATA TYPE USER1S INPUT FILE(CREIN) FTREE INPUT FILE(FTIIF) 
TITlE TITlE 
TITLE AND * IROPzMCOMBzPSTRNC 
IFSTGzILSTGzIFGTEzILGTE IFSTGzILSTGzIFGTEzILGTE 
CONTROL BLOCK 
** ** 
FTHRS FTHRS 
· · 
· 
• 
· · 
INPUT BLOCK * ISTGzEFCTlMzI1 
· · 
· · 
· · 
· · 
· 
• 
· · 
LOGIC BLOCK IGTEzITYPzIIIPUTS TO GATE IGTEz ITYP z INPUTS TO GATE 
· · 
· · 
· · 
* Record generated by CAREIN 
** Record not used by CARE3 version of FTREE 
FIGURE 3.5-6 System Fault Tree: FTREE Input 
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PRBMT, MINTRM 
PROO, MINTRM 
PRBMT, MINTRM 
FIGURE 3.5-.7 System Fault Tree: FTREE Output 
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3.5.3 Critical Pairs Fault Tree(s) 
The preprocessing of the critical pairs fault tree(s) is performed by the 
input programCAREIN. Figure 3.5-8 illustrates the user's input data for 
a critical pairs fault tree (on file CREIN) and the corresponding input 
for FTREE generated by CAREIN. (Refer to the CARE-I II User' s Manual for a 
description of the input data formats.) A brief description of each of 
the parameters in Figure 3.5-8 follows: 
• TITLE: 
• IROP: 
• MCOMB: 
One or more lines of descriptive text. 
FTREE run option; set to 3 by CAREIN. 
The maximum number of input gate (unit) failures; set to 
2 by CAREIN. 
• PSTRNC: Perfect coverage truncation value; set to 10-14. by 
CAREIN. 
• IFUNT: 
• ILUNT: 
• IFGTE: 
• ILGTE: 
The number of the first input gate (unit); it must be 
set by user to the number of the first unit in the first 
stage of the tree. 
The number of the last input gate (unit); it must be set 
by user to the number of the last unit in the last stage 
of the tree. 
The number of the first logic gate in the critical pairs 
fault tree. 
The nt.l1lber of the last logic gate in the critical pairs 
fault tree. 
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• FTHRS: 
• ISTG: 
The flight time (in hours); computed by CAREIN from the 
input variable FT in NAMELIST/RNTIME/. 
The number of a stage in the critical pairs tree; CAREIN 
generates (ISLUNT-ISFUNT + 1) FTREE input gates (mod-
ules), for each stage. 
• ISFUNT: The number of the first input gate (module) in the stage 
numbered IST6. 
• ISLUNT: The number of the 1 ast input gate (modul e) in the stage 
numbered ISTG. 
• IUNT: 
• UNTLM: 
• Tl: 
• IGTE: 
• ITYP: 
The number of an input gate (module) in the stage 
numbered ISTG: ISFUNT IUNT ISLUNT. 
The failure of an input gate (module) in the stage 
numbered ISTG; the CAREIN estimate of the fai lure rate 
for the units in a stage is described in the text below. 
FTREE control code set to 1 by CAREIN: this forces FTREE 
to consider UNTLM the failure rate and FTHRS the time 
used to compute the probability of failure of the input 
gate (module). 
The number of a logic gate in the critical pairs fault 
tree. 
The type of a logic gate; refer to the CARE-III User's 
Manual for a description of the logic gate types. 
• INPUTS: A string of gate numbers listing the inputs to the logic 
gate. 
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Figure 3.5-9 illustrates the output data (MINTRM) file generated on unit 
FT25F when a critical pairs fault tree is processed by FTREE. Such a set 
of records is written to unit FT25F for each of the critical pairs trees 
input by the user. A brief description of each of the parameters in 
Figure 3.5-9 follows. 
• NUNTS: The total number of modules in the stages in the crit-
ical pairs trees (ILUNT-IFUNT + 1) 
• PRBMT: The FTREE estimate of the probability of a critical pair 
system failure due to the set of unit failures indicated 
by the corresponding MINTRM. 
• MINTRM: A fault vector (1 = failed, 0 = not-failed) for a 
failed state of the system; each fault vector has NUNTS 
components (i.e., one for each unit). 
In Section 3.4, it was shown that the critical pairs fault tree data is 
used in the calculation of the rate for transitions between the Q{-f.J and 
F{-t) or F{~+l{Y» states. In particular the factors: 
(I) 
b (E....,-L), 
X,y 
(2) 
b (E....,..l:.J , 
x,y 
depend on the number of (x,y) critical pairs, N{x,y). However, in the 
CARE-III program, the corresponding calculations involve the factor: 
bxy{ i (x)- P (x), L (y)- P (y» 
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which is defined verbally on page 6 of the CARE-III Maintenance Manual, 
L. A. Bryant, and J. J. Stiffler (1982a), but is not defined by an equa-
tion in any CARE-III document. Review of subroutine CRTLPRS indicates the 
following definition: 
kxy ( L (x)- J.l (x), i (y)- Jl (y)) X'fy, 
(n(x)-i (x)+Jl(x))(n(y)- i(y)+J.l(y)) 
bXY ( i (x)- J.l (x), .i (y)- J.l (y)) = 
kXY ( P(x)-J.l(x), i(x)-J.l(x)) x=y, 
(n(x)-l (x)+J.l (x))(n(x)- i (x)+J.l (x)-I) 
where kXY ( 1 (x) - J.l (x), L (y) - J.l (y)) is the number of (?(,y) critical 
pairs (x,a), (y,b) such that there are at least P (x) -)1 (x) modules 
(x,a
'
) and at least iCy) - J.L"(y) modules (y,b ' ) for which 
a < ai, 
b < b
'
• 
Note that, since the counts lexy depend on the numbers assigned to the 
modules, the b
xy and hence the solution of the reliability model will 
depend on the numbering of the modules. This situation is inconsistent 
with the assumption that all modules within a stage are identical. The 
calculation of kxy is further complicated by logic which depends on the 
(user supplied) NOP data; BCS has not been able to make a reasonable 
interpretation of this logic. The (user supplied) LC data is available, 
but not used, in the kXY calcualation. 
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DATA TYPE USERIS INPUT FILE{CREIN) 
TITlE 
TITlE AND * 
IFUNTaILUNTaIFGTE,ILGTE 
CONTROL BLOCK ** 
FTIlRS 
· 
· 
· 
INPUT BLOCK +ISTG 2 ISFUNT2 ISLUNT 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
LOGIC BLOCK I GTE 2 ITYP 2 INPUTS TO GATE 
· 
· 
· 
* Record generated by CAREIN 
** Record not used by CARE3 version of FTREE 
+ Not a standard FTREE input block record; 
FTREE INPUT FILE{FT11F) 
TITlE 
IROPaMC0M8aPSTRNC 
IFUNT2 1LUNT2 1FGTE2 1LGTE 
** 
FTHRS 
· 
· 
· 
WNT 2 UNTlM, 11 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
· 
IGTE 2 1TYP 21NPUTS TO GATE 
· 
· 
· 
{ISLUNT-ISFUNT+l)FTREE input block records generated per second 
FIGURE 3.5-8 Critical Pairs Fault Tree: FTREE Input 
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* o. 
* NUNTS 
PRBMT,MINTRM 
PRBMT,MINTRM 
PRBMT,MINTRM 
* Record Generated by eREIN 
FIGURE 3.5-9 Critical Pairs Fault Tree: FTREE Output 
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3.5.4 Outline of Calculations 
The evaluation of the system reliability R(t) is performed by the main 
program CARE3; the calculation is partitioned into IISUBRUN'sll which 
consist of the evaluation of the reliability of subsystems which are 
independent in the sense that modules in different' subsystems are not 
critically coupled· as defined by the critical pairs tree(s). (The 
possible coupling of subsystems by the system fault tree does not appear 
to be considered.) For each SUBRUN, the calculation of reliability is 
controlled by RLSBRN which calls NFLTVDP and GNFLTVC to generate all fault 
vectors JL for the subsystem, partition the fault vectors into two 
disjoint subsets Ls and [s and compute Q(t 11J for l:...€ Ls and P*(t 1 JL) 
for .JL € [s. The cal cu 1 at ions performed by NFL TVDP and GNFL TVC are 
outlined in Tables 3.5-1 and 2, respectively, and all basic reliability 
functions used in the calculations are defined in Section 3.5.5. 
The calculation of the system unreliability as a function of SUBRUN 
results is implemented in GNFLTVC and CARE3 and depends on whether or not 
the user supplies a system fault tree. BCS has carefully reviewed the 
program logic and determined that the following equations define the 
calculation of system unreliability that is actually implemented in CARE-
llI. 
• No System Fault Tree 
In this case, the system unreliability is computed by GNFLTVC as follows: 
l.-R(t) 
- L: [ L: Q(tL~J + L: P*(tll.J]' 
SUBRUN's .L eLs Le Ls 
3.5-1 
where 
Q(tl1-) = .It K(tl.iJ dT, 
o 
3.5-2 
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P*(t 11) = n 
x E SUBRUN ( 
n(x)) 
i(x) 
n(x)- i(x) £(x) 
(r(tlx)) (1.-r(tlx)) 
3.5-3 
Under the assumption that the default system tree is an OR tree (spares 
exhaustion of any stage fails the system), equation 3.5-1 reduces to 
equation 3.3-5 for the case of one SUBRUN. For the case of more than one 
SUBRUN, the interpelation of equation 3.5-1 and its relation to equation 
3.3-5 is no longer clear. 
• System Fault Tree 
In this case, the system unreliability is computed by GNFLTVC and CARE3 as 
follows: 
l.-R(t) = I: [I: Q(t 11)] + I: [n{p;~~~:~t' x) ~:~~~:~:~}] 
SUBRUN's J.... E Ls MINTRM's x 
3.5.4 
where 
P*(t I x) = 
L: n(x) 
1(x)=n(x)-m(x)+1 ( 
n(x) ) n(x)- i(x) i(x) 
(r(tlx)) (1.-r(tlx)) , 
i(x) 
3.5.5 
and the MINTRM's in the second term of equation 3.5-4 are defined by FTREE 
from the system fault tree. The second term in equation 3.5-4 appears to 
be a correct interpretation of the FTREE output MINTRM file and a good 
approximation to the second term in equation 3.3-5. However, for the 
first term, the relation between Ls for a SUBRUN and the system fault tree 
(i .e., L in equation 3.3-5) is not clear and appears to be in error even 
for the case of one SUBRUN. For the case of more than one SUBRUN, the 
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interpretation of the first term in equation 3.5-1 and its relation to the 
first term in equation 3.3-5 is no longer clear. 
BCS is currently investigating the questions raised by these observations. 
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00 
en 
FUNCTION 
A(tlx i ) 
A(tlx i ) 
r(tlx i ) 
r(tlx) 
a(tlx i ) 
Table 3.5-1 
RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS (Non-~-dependent) 
DESCRIPTION 
Rate of occurrence of category -xi faults 
at time t. 
Cumulative rate of occurrence of category 
-xi faults. 
Probabi 1 ity that a stage -x modul e has 
not experienced at category -xi fault by 
time t. 
Reliability of a stage -x module at time 
t. 
Probability that a stage -x module has a 
latent, non-transient (transient) 
category -xi faul t at time t, gi ven that 
it has (not) experienced a non-transient 
or leaky transient fault by time t. 
SUBROUTINE 
FLAM 
FCLAM 
FRXIFF 
CRXFF 
CAXLAT 
ARRAYS 
RXAR 
AXIAR 
PARAMETERS 
A (xi) 
W (xi) 
A(tlx;) 
A(tlx i ) 
hDPT(t,1 x;) 
r(tlx;) 
HL(tlx i ) 
r(tlx) 
co 
'-I 
Table 3.5-1 (Continued) 
RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS (Non-Jl-dependent) 
FUNCTION 
a(tlx) 
DESCRIPTION 
Probability that a stage -x module has a 
latent, non-transient fault at time t, 
gi ven that it has experi enced some non-
transient fault at time t. 
hOPT(tlxi ) Rate at which a transient, category -xi 
fault is detected as permanent at time t. 
HL(tlx i ) 
hF(tlxi) 
gF(tlx i ) 
Probability of a latent, category -xi 
fault at time t. 
Rate of error propagation system failure 
due to a category -xi fault at time t. 
Rate of error propagation system failure 
due to a category -xi fault at time t, 
given that it was latent prior to t. 
SUBROUTINE 
FOSCRTL 
FBCRTL 
FHSFST 
FHSFST 
FHSFST 
FGST 
ARRAYS 
PDP 
PLAT 
(TAPE9) 
GORHSF 
GORHSF 
(TAPE10) 
PARAMETERS 
a(tlx i ) 
aOp,bOp'cOp 
012 
mOF,mOF,mOF 
aL,bL,cL 
012 ML ,ML,ML 
aF,bF,cF 
o 1 2 
mF,mF,mF 
hF(tlx i ) 
a(tlxi ) 
FUNCTION 
Hs(tlx i ) 
Gs(tIXi ) 
co 
co 
HB(tlx i ) 
hOF(tlx i ) 
Table 3.5-1 (Continued) 
RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS (Non-~-dependent) 
DESCRIPTION 
Probability of a non-benign, latent 
category -xi fault at time t. 
Probability of a non-benign, 1 atent 
category -xi fault at time t, given that 
it was latent prior to t. 
Probability of a benign, latent category 
-xi fault at time t. 
Rate of system fai lure due to critically 
coupled category -xi and category -Yj 
faults at time t. 
SUBROUTINE 
FHSFST 
FGST 
FHSFST 
FHOFST 
ARRAYS 
PNBNG 
GORHSF 
(TAPEll) 
PBNG 
HOFPTS 
(TAPE12) 
PARAMETERS 
as'bs,cs 
W!~~ B' B' B 
Hg-(tlx i ) 
a(tlx i ) 
aB,bB,cB 
o 1 2 MB,MB,MB 
aOF ' bOp cOF 
012 
mOF,mOF,mOF 
Table 3.5-2 
RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS (Jl-dependent) 
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION SUBROUTINE ARRAYS PARAMETERS 
P*(t IJl) Probability that a system has FPSTAR n,1.. 
sustained exactly .1. failures FPSTREE r(tlx) 
by time t. 
P(,u(x), t I £ (x)) Probability that a system has FPMUX R.,1. 
~l(x) stage -x latent, a(tlx) 
permanent faults given that it 
OJ has 1 (x) faults. \!) 
K(tl.1) SUMMAT SUMK c(t IL'Yj) 
P*(t IJJ 
A(tllJ 
I 
a (til) 
C(tJ.1.'Yj) Probability of system failure FCYJ GNBNG GB"(t I xi) 
due to a category -Y j fault at 
time t, given Jl faults at time D (t It, x. ,Y j) - 1 
t. 
Table 3.5-2 (Continued) 
RELIABILITY CALCULATIONS (jl-dependent) 
FUNCTION DE SCR I PTI ON SUBROUTINE ARRAYS PARAMETERS 
\ I 
hDF(tlxi'Yj) A (tllJ Rate of system failure due to FAC HDFPTS 
critical fault conditions for HLAT HL (t I xi) 
L faul ts at time t. 
B(tl1.,xi'Yj) 
I 
a (til) Rate of system fai lure due to FAPC GFLD n,L 
error propagation for t faults gF(tlxi ) 
1.0 at time t. a(tlx i ) 0 
D(t\L,xi 'Yj) Expected number of category - FDSCRTL BXYAR a(tlx i ) 
xi' -Yj critical faults, given a(tlx) 
L faults at time t that would P(jt(x), t Il(x)) 
be created as the result of a bxy 
stage -Y fault at time t. 
B(tIL,xi'Yj) Expected number of category - FBCRTL BXYAR a(tlx i ) 
xi' -Yj critical faults, given 
I faults at time t. 
P(P(x),t I J(x)) 
bXkY 
3.5.5 Basic Reliability Functions 
The basic reliability functions are the time dependent rate and 
probability functions used in the calculation of the reliability for a 
subsystem (i.e., a CARE-III SUBRUN). The subroutines, arrays or I/O units 
used to compute and store the function values were specified in Tables 
3.5-1 and -2. In this section the definition of each function, as 
obtained from the CARE-III code, are presented along with remarks about 
any inconsistencies with the CARE-III documents and/or BCS I analysis of 
the CARE-III reliability model. In the definitions, the functions are 
defined for any time t >0, but in the CARE3' program the functions are 
evaluated only at the discrete time points for which the reliability model 
is solved: 
• 
• 
tj = (j-1) .1 t; j = 1,2, ••• ,j max. 
= 
/t A(r I xi) dr 
o 
~(Xi)t] W(Xi) 
3.5-1 
3.5-2 
3.5-3 
The CARE-III documents give different definitions for A (tIXi ) and 
A(tlxi ); although the documented definitions are consistent with each 
other, the user will not obtain the Weibull failure model he expects. 
€ 
- A (tIXi) : xi non-transient fault 
• 3.5-4 
xi transient fault 
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1. 
xi non-transient fault 
1.-r(tlx) 
• a(tlx i ) = HL(tIXi ) 3.5-5 
1. xi transient fault 
• a(tlx) = L: a(tlx i ) 3.5-6 i 
The function a(tlx) is computed as defined in equation 3.5-6 in 
subroutines FDSCRTL and FBCRTL to compute D(tl...t,xi'Yj) and B(tl..i..,xiYj) 
and subroutine FPMUX to compute P(p(x),t ~(x)). BCS has determined that 
the sum in equation 3.5-6 should be over only non-transient, category -xi 
faults to make a(tlx) consistent with its definition and use in CARE-III. 
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• p*(tl J. ) = n (n(x)) x J. (x) (1.-r(tlx~ l{x) (r(tlx)) n(x)- J.{x) 3.5-7 
• P (~(x),tl..!.Jx)) = (J.{X)) ~(x) (1. _ a(t I x)) J. (x) - ~ (x) (a(t1x)) ~(x) 3.5:-8 
• hOPT(tlx;) = jt POP (Tlk(Xi l) >. (t-T J xi ldT 3.5-9 
= aop(tlx;) m~p (tlk(X;)) + bop(tlx;)m~p (tlk(X;)) + Cop(tlx;)m~p (tlk(X;)) 3.5-10 
1.0 
w 
~t ~r(t-TI xl : xi non-transient fault 
• HL(tlx;) = o PL (T1k(X;)) A(t-T I xi) , ' 1 dT 3.5-11 
1. : x; transient fault 
, 
= aL (tl xi lM~ (tJ k(xi l) + bL (tl xi lM~ (tJ k(x f ~ + cL (tl xi lM~ (t Ik(Xi l) 3.5-12 
-"~) 
\N 
hF(tlxi ) 
/t () {r(t-'7" 1 xl : xI non-transIent faUlt} 
• = PF rlk(x i ) A(t-rlxi ) dr 3.5-13 
o 1. : xi transient fault 
= aF(tlxi)m; (t1k(Xi )) + bF(tlxi)m~ (t1k(Xi ))+ cF(tlxi)m~ (tlk(X i )) 3.5-14 
" 1. 
xi non-transient fault 1.-r(tlx) 
• 9F(tlx i ) = 
hF(tlxi ) 
a(t I xi) " r . 3.5-15 
U) 1. xi transient fault ~ 
r(t-rlx) xi non-transient fault 
• HB(t I xi) = It '8('7"1 k(X;l) A(t-'7"lxll dr 3.5-16 
1. xi transient fault 
= "B(tlxll~ (tlk(X;l)+ bjj(tlx;l~ (tJk(X;l)+ Cjj(tlx;l{ (tIk{X;l) 3.5-17 
1.0 
U1 
• 'i(t\ xi) 
• Hs(tlx i ) 
1. 
1.-r(tl x) xi non-transient fault 
HB(t!xi ) 
= 
a(tlx.) 
"' 1 
,. 3.5-18 
1. . Xi transient fault . 
r(t-Tlx) xi non-transient fault 
. t 
= f P S ( T I k (x i) ) A (t-T ! xi) dT 3·.5-19 
1. xi transient fault 
= aB(tlx;)M~ (t1k(X;))+ bB(tIX;)M~ (tlk(X;))+ CB(tlx;)M! (tlk(X f )) 3.5-20 
~ 
0\ 
r(t-"./x)r(t-".Iy) xi and Yj are 
non-transient faults 
r(t-"./x) 
• hOF(tlxi'Yj) =j(t pOF(Tlk(Xj),k(Yj))HB(t-Tlxi)A(t-TIYj) r(t-r/y) 
Xi non-transient and 
Yj transient faults 
: xi transient and I d". 
• K(tl~J 
1. 
Yj non-transient faults 
xi and Yj are 
transient faults 
= aOF ( t I xl'Yj )m~F (tl k (xi) ,k (Yj)) + bOF ( t I xi'Y j )m~F ( tl k (xi )(k(Yj)) 
+ CoF (tlx.,y.)m
2 (tlk(x.)k(Y.)) 
1 J OF 1 J 
= ;: ~ c (t Il...-.!Jy) 'Yj) p* (t Il...-.!JY)) (n(y)-! (Y)+l) A(tl Yj) 
+ [ A I (t /l.J + a I (t I JJ] P* ( t I..!J 
3.5-21 
3.5-22 
3.5-23 
.. 
-J 
The evaluation of K(tllJ requires the calculation of P*(tllJ and p* (tIL-l(Y)) 
subroutine SUMAT, N calls are made to subroutine FPSTAR to compute p* (tIL-l(Y)) and 
subroutine FPSTREC to compute p*(tljl) from p* (tIJl-l(N)) by the recurrence relation: 
P*(tl.l) = n(y)- j(y)+l J(y) 
(l.-r(tly)) ( 
r(tly) p* tIJl-l(y)) 
for y=l, •.• ,N; in 
one call is made to 
3.5-24 
This approach requires N calculations of the p* function, which as equation 3.5-7 .shows requires the 
evaluation of a combinatorial term. ,An improved procedure would be to compute p*(tI.1J once using 
subroutine FPSTAR and then compute the p* (t I..L -l(y)) by equation 3.5-24; this approach requires only one 
~ calculation of a combinatorial term. 
• C(tIL'Yj) = I: l= G'B(tIXi)D(tLL,xi'Yj) 
x , 
=I:L 
x i 
H£3( t I xi) 
a(tlx i ) 
D(tIJl,xi 'Yj) 
3.5-25 
1. 
xi non-transient fault 
1.-r(tlx) 
3.5-26 
1. xi transient fault 
U) 
co 
The CARE-III documents give a different definition for C(tIJl'Yj)' i.e., 
• C(t 11..,y j) " It:"( t I xi) = L: L..J B O(tIL,xi'Yj)' 
x i HL(tlx i ) 
BCS is currently investigating this apparent problem. 
I 
• A (tl.lJ 
I 
• . a (tIJl) 
=L:L:~~ 
X i Y . j 
hOF ( tl xi'Y j) 
HL(tlxi)HL(tIYj) B(tIL,xi'Yj) 
= L: ~ a(tlx;)gF(t\x;) 
x i 
i(x) xi non-transient fault 
n(x)- J(x) xi transient fault 
3.5-27 
3.5-28 
3.5-29 
1.0 
1.0 
J{x} xi non-transient fault 
l.-r(t I x) 
= ~~ hF(tlxi ) . J -r 3.5-30 x i 
I 
n(x)- J(x) xi transient fault 
I 
. BCS has identified a programming error in subroutine FAPC which computes a (tl..tJ; this error has been 
corrected on the BCS version of CARE-III and NASA has been informed of the problem. 
• O(t 1...L,x; ,Y j) = p~) bxy (t(X)- p(x), i(y )-p (y)) P (P(x), t I1<x) )p ( p(y), t I I(Y)) 
Jl (y) 
a(tlx i ) 
;Jl(x) a(tlx) non-transient 
(n(x)- t (x)) a(tl xi) : transient 
3.5-31 
• B(tl..L,xi'Yj) = ~ bxy (i(X)- Jl(x),£(y)- Jl(Y))p (Jl(X),tU(X))p(Jl(y),tli(Y))C(xi'Yj)a(t/xi)a(tIYj) 
. Jl(x) . 
Jl(Y) 3.5-32 
I-' 
o 
o 
where 
C(xi'Yj) = 
Jl(x)M(Y) 
a(t/x)a(tly) 
M(X) (M(x)-l.) 
a(tlx)a(tlx) 
(n(x)- i(x)){Jl(y)- j,(y)) 
(n(x)- l(x)) (n(x)- j, (x)-l) 
M(x) (n(y)- j, (y)) 
a(tlx) 
(n(x)- 1 (x)) Jl(y) 
a(tl y) 
x~y, xi and Yj non-transient faults 
x=y, xi and Yj non-transient faults 
x~y, xi and Yj transient faults 3.5-33 
x=y, xi and Yj transient faults 
xi non-transient and Yj transient faults 
xi transient and Yj non-transient faults 
3.6 COMPUTATIONAL METHODS 
In the previous section the implementation of the reliability model in the 
CARE3 program was outlined; now, the computational methods used to solve 
the model equations will be reviewed. The objective of this section is to 
document the numerical procedures that are implemented and present the BCS 
evaluation of these algorithms in the CARE-III environment. In the fol-
lowing sections the numerical procedures are first highlighted and then 
discussed in detail. 
3.6.1 Overview of Algorithms 
In this section each of the numerical procedures used in the CARE3 program 
is highlighted. The requirements for the algorithm and its implementation 
are discussed first, followed by a preview of the BCS analysis of the 
algorithm in the CARE-III context. In the succeeding sections a detailed 
description and analysiS of each algorithm is provided. 
• Numerical Integration 
The calculation of the unreliability Q(t 11J for a fault vector t 
requires the calculation of the integral of K(t I 1-): 
. t 
Q (t 1 -1.) = 1 K ( T ,-1) d T 
o 
(3.6-1) 
where K(t 11J can be computed from the reliability data, critical 
pairs fault tree(s) data and the output of the coverage model (see 
Section 3.2). The numerical integration procedure is based on 
Simpson I s Rule and is implemented in subroutines UNRELQ, SUMMAT and 
FINTGRT. Both Q(t I.1J and K(t 11J are computed at the (equally 
spaced with stepsize L1 t) discrete time points for the reliability 
model. 
101 
BCS has carefully reviewed UNRELQ, FINTGRT and SUMMAT and the sub-
routines which they use; no programming errors in the implementation 
of Simpson's Rule were detected by the review. However, a program-
ming error in subroutine FAPC (called by SUMMAT) was discovered; this 
error is discussed in Section 3.5.5. 
e. Numerical Convolution 
The calculation of K(....!.. I t) for a fault vector t requires several 
calculations of the convolution of two functions, PI(t) and P2(t): 
y(t) = j\2( T) PI (t - T ) d T 
o 
(3.6-2) 
where PI (t) is the measure of the rate' at which a certain class of 
fault occurs and P2 (T) is a function of the interval, T, between 
that occurrence and the entry of the fault into a particular 
coverage-mode 1 state. Each of the output coverage funct ions, PDP' 
PL, PF, PS' PB and PDF' enter into such a convolution calculation (see Section 3.2). The numerical convolution procedure is based on 
the method of moments and is implemented in subroutines, FHSFST, 
FHDFST, ABCST, FFSFST and FFDFST. 
BCS has carefully revi ewed FHSFST, FHDFST, ABCST, FFSFST and FFDFST 
and the subroutines which they use; no programming errors in the 
implementation of the method of moments were detected by the review. 
However, BCS has raised questions about the accuracy of the method of 
. moments for calculating the required convolutions; these questions 
are addressed in detail in Section 3.6.3. 
3.6.2 Numerical Integration 
The numerical integration procedure used in the CARE3 program is based on 
Simpson's Rule and is implemented in subroutines UNRELQ, SUMMAT and 
FINTGRT, specifically to compute the integrals: 
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t" 
Q(tj 11) = f R( T I J)d T j = 1, 2, •••• , jmax' 
o 
(3.6-3) 
where 1... is a fault vector and tj; j = 1, 2, ••• ', jmax are equally spaced 
discrete time points for the reliability model: 
tj = (j - 1)L1t; j = 1,2, ••• , jmax (3.6-4) 
The function K(t 11J is evaluated by subroutine SUMMAT (see Section 3.2 
for a description of the calculations involved) and the integrals are 
evaluated as follows by subroutine UNRELQ: 
• Case 1: j = 1 
Q ( tIl 1..) = o. , (3.6-5) 
• Case 2 = j > 1, j even 
Q(t" 1 L) = L j Fk 
J - k=2 
(3.6-6) 
k even 
• Case 3 = j > 1, j odd 
Q (tJ" 1 £) = Lj Fk 
- k=3 
(3.6-7) 
k odd 
where the Fk are computed in subroutin~ FINTGRT: 
• Case 1 : k = 1 -
(3.6-8) 
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• Case 2 : k = 2 
(3.6-9) 
• Case 3 : k > 2 
(3.6-10) 
3.6.3 Numerical Convolution 
The numerical convolution procedure used in the CARE3 program is based on 
the method of moments and is implemented in subroutines FHSFST, FHDFST, 
ABCST, FFSFST and FFDFST specifically to compute the convolutions: 
t. 
y(tj) = f ~2( T) PI (t - T )d T, (3.6-11) 
o 
where P1(t) is a reliability model function of the form: 
si ngle fault, 
Ax.y. (t) double fault, 
1 J 
(3.6-12) 
P2(t) is one of the coverage model output functions, PDP' PL' PF' PB' Ps 
and PDF' and tj; j = 1, 2, ••• , jmax are equally spaced discrete time 
points for the reliability model: 
t j = (j - 1).1 t; j = 1, 2, •••• , j m ax. (3.6-13) 
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The procedure is based on the critical assumptions that P1 (t) is a much 
-more slowly varying function of time than is P2(t) and that P2(t) decays 
rapidly to zero: 
P2( T) ~ O. : T> to> 0., (3.6-14) 
2 
P1 (t- T)~ aCt) + T bet) + T c(t) : 0 ~ T ~ to' to> O. (3.6-15) 
Under these assumptions: 
t -
y(tj ) = f ~2( T) (a{tj ) + T b(tj ) + T 2C{tj »d T, (3.6-15) 
. tOt t 
= a(tj)f~2(T)dT + b(tj)f~ P2(T)dT + c(t j )J oT 2P2(T)dT, (3.6-16) o 0 0 
= a(t j ) M~(to) + b(tj) M~(to) + c(tj ) M~(to)' (3.6-17) 
where 
3.6-18 
The time to and the coefficients, a(tj ), b(tJ) and c(tj ) are computed by 
subroutine ABCST to make the approximation to P1 (tj - T) exact at tj - to' 
tj - (to/2) and t j • Subroutines FFSFST and FFDFST are called by ABCST to 
compute P1(t) for the single or double fault cases, respectively. 
Finally, the approximate values of y{tj) are evaluated. by subroutines 
FHSFST and FHDFST for the single or double fault cases, respectively. 
BCS has raised questions about the accuracy of the method of moments, as 
implemented in CARE-III, for computing the convolution in equation 3.6-11. 
Since this convolution provides the crucial links between the coverage 
model and the reliability model, its accurate evaluation is important for 
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the CARE-III estimate of reliability. The assumption that P1(t) is a much 
more slowly varying function of time than is P2(t) is consistent with the, 
CARE-III assumption that coverage rates are much higher than module 
failure rates; therefore, this assumption should not degrade the accuracy 
of the solution. 
However, the assumption that P2( r) decays rapidly to zero may not be 
valid for all coverage model parameters; indeed for some cases P2( r) 
decays to a non-zero steady state value. In such a case two sources of 
error develop in the calculation; first, the contribution to the convolu-
tion for r > to' which is neglected, may become significant and second, 
the approximation to PI (t) becomes less accurate as to becomes larger. In 
the'CARE-III implementation this potential source of error is not estimat-' 
ed or monitored. 
BCS is currently investigating the impact of this problem on the CARE-III 
reliability estimate by running cases with coverage models that do not 
satisfy the assumptions in equations 3.6-14 to 3.6-15. 
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Section 4 
COVERAGE MODEL 
The theory and implementation of the CARE-III coverage model is described 
in this section. The mathematical details of the coverage model have been 
extracted from the CARE-III documentation, J. J. Stiffler, L. A. Bryant 
and L. Guccione (1979), J. J. Stiffler and L. A. Bryant (1982), J. J. 
Stiffler, J. S. Neumann and L. A. Bryant (1982) and the CARE-III program 
(Version 3, 1982). In those areas where the documentation is vague or 
incomplete, BCS has completed the model specifications based on its 
understanding of the applicable reliability methods. 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present the single and double fault coverage models 
and their mathematical solution in terms of a sequence of Volterra 
Integral Equations of the second kind. The implementation of the coverage 
models is described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, first an overiew of the 
COVRGE program is presented inSect ion 4.3 and then the computat i ona 1 
methods used in COVRGE are highlighted in Section 4.4. 
Any discrepencies between the CARE-III documentation or the COVRGE program 
and the coverage mode 1, as found by BCS duri ng the Task 1 revi ew, are 
pointed out in the discussion in Section 4. 
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4.1 STOCHASTIC COVERAGE MODEL 
The two Coverage Model s are used to analyze the 1 atency peri ad of a faul t 
and the interaction of latent faults in a critical pair. These models are 
described in detail in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4, and are used to derive 
the transition rates for the Aggregate Model ·as shown in Section 3.4. 
The coverage functions needed in the calculation of these rates are the 
state probabilities for different coverage states and the intensities of 
entry into failure state. 
All the calculations are done within the context of the coverage dynamics, 
independently of the dynamics of the rest Of the system, so the 
reversibility argument given in Section 3.1.6 for transient faults (back-
ward transition in vector .JJ is irrelevant for the Coverage Models. The 
functions to be obtained in Section 4.2 are then valid for both transient 
and non-transient faults. 
More specifically the functions needed from each of the Coverage Model s 
are as follows: 
• From the Single Fault Coverage. Model, SFCM, and for each fault 
category xi: 
The intensity of entry at time t into failure state F: PF(t); and 
the probabilities that at time t, the fault is in 
benign state B: PB(t), 
non-benign state 1;: P1;(t) , 
latent stateL: Pl(t), 
detected as permanent state OP: Pop(t}. 
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Where B = A or E, 
. and L = l; or B for a non-transient fault, 
for a transient fault. 
• From the Double Fault Coverage Model, DFCM, and for each pair of 
fault categories xi' Yj: 
... 
The intensity of entry at time t into the Double-Fault failure 
state DF: PDF(t). 
In all the above functions, time t is measured from time of first entry 
into state A for SFCM, and first entry into state B1 A2 for DFCM. 
Hol di ng times in each state, though not necessarily exponenti ally distri-
buted, are independent from past dynamics and so the Coverage Models, SFCM 
and DFCM, are homogeneous semi-Markov processes with respective initial 
States A and B1A2• In Section 4.2 it is shown how properties of semi-
Markov processes - see Appendix - are used to derive the functions that 
are of interest to solve the reliability problem. 
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4.2 SOLUTION OF COVERAGE MODELS 
4.2.1 Single Fault Coverage Model 
The Single Fault Coverage Model is shown in Figure 4.2-1. Transitions out 
of each state are measured from the time of entry into it, except for the 
two error states. In ,this case transitions are measured from time of 
entry into the active-error state AE• The essence of this interpretation 
is that detection schedules are independent of fluctuations between active 
and benign states. The model can be reduced by replacing the two error 
states by one E shown in Figure 4.2-1 as a rectangular block. This 
interpretation although not consistent with the description of the SFCM 
given by J. J. Stiffler and L. A. Bryant (1982), coincides with the 
present version of CARE III. 
The input parameters (0', f3, (,(t) , p(t), e{t), C, PA, PB) determine 
the transition probability distributions Qij(t). The derivatives of 
Qij(t) and the holding time distributions hi(t) are given in Table, 4.2-1. 
These are then used to calculate the first entry or return distributions 
Fij(t) or the entry intensities fij(t), and from these the state 
probabilities Pij(t). 
The model corresponding to the case PA = PB = 1 is simpler and affords an 
easier solution. The general model can then be solved from the simpler 
one as follows. 
Let Fx(t) denote the probability of being in state x at time t, given that 
PA = PB = 1 (i.e., given that the faulty element has not yet been returned 
to active state A after possible detection); Gx(t) denote the probability 
of the same event but under no restrictions on PA and PB; and A(t) denote 
the intensity of first return to active state A after detection. 
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Figure 4.2-1 Single Fault Coverage Model 
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To 
State 
From j 
State i 
1. A 
2. B 
::: 3. E 
N 
4. AD 
5. BO 
6. F 
7. OP 
TABLE 4.2-1 Single-Fault Coverage Model 
• Transition probability densities Qij(t} 
and holding time distributions hi(t} 
1.A 2.B 3.E 4.AO 5.BO 6.F 
ae~td(t }r( t} eatd(t}P(t} eat8(t}r(t} 
~e {-3t 
(1-PA}L\(t) 
f(t} = 
(l-PB}L\(t) 
fJ + a exp( -( a+ l3)t} 
a + {3 
Cf(t}f(t} Cf(t}(1-f(t}} (1-C}f(t) 
L\ (t) = Oirac's delta 
7.0P I hi(t} 
eatd(t}r(t} 
etH 
e(t} 
PA L\(t} 1 
PBL\(t} 1 
1 
1 
Then it follows that for any state x different from B, 
(t A(u) G (t-u) du )0 x 
where the integral accounts for all possible cycles· through the· system 
until ending in state x at time t. 
It also follows that 
where '" A(t) and "'B(t) are the intensities of entry into states AO and 
BO respectively, given PA = PB = 1. 
For the case of state B a modification should be made. Instead of using 
FB(t), use FB(t) + X B(t), 
where X B(t) = Probability of entering BO for the first time and then 
remaining in the benign state until time t 
= (l-PB}l
t 
"'B(U) exp [-P(t-U}] duo 
In Table 4.2-2, a summary of the Single-Fault Model Equations is given 
with the corresponding definitions and mathematical expressions. 
As an example the first two formulas are derived. 
¢ (t) is p-1 times the intensity of reentry into state A 
exactly t time units after previous entry. 
is the probability of being in state A at time t, when PA 
= PB = 1. 
113 
Using the notation given in the Appendix and the numbering of states in 
Table 4.2-1, these terms are p-1fll (t) and PH (t) respectively. So for 
the first function, 
where 
I Q12(t) = a exp( - at) d(t) r(t), 
I 
and f 21 (t) = Q21(t) = pexp(-pt). 
Hence 
.p(t) = a exp( - pt) lt exp [-xC a - P)] d(x) r( x) dx. 
Similarly for the second function, 
PaCt) = Putt) = hl(t) +It FU(dx) Putt-x) 
= hl(t) +It fll(x) Pll(t-x) dx 
= exp(-at) d(t) ret) +It .p(t-x) Pa(x) dx. 
The mathematical expressions shown in Table 4.2-2 for the functions lB(t) 
and Fx(t) differ from those given by J. J. Stiffler and L. A. Bryant 
(1981), and from those implemented in the present version of CARE-III. 
The suggested changes account for possible returns to the benign state B 
from state BO with probability 1-PB and thus affect the calculation of the 
probability of being in the benign state at time t: PB(t). The present 
implemented version is only valid if PB = O. 
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I-' 
I-' 
U1 
FUNCTION 
cP (t) 
Pa(t) 
Pb(t) 
Pe(t) 
Table 4.2-2 
Single-Fault Model Equations 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
a e - p t f: e - (a - p ) u r{ u) d (u) du 
e- at r{t) d{t) + p f: '" (t-u) P .(u) du 
'" It) + p f: '" (t-u) Pb{u) du 
f: e- au p (u) dIu) e{t-u) du + fJ f: '" (t-u) P e{u) du 
* t Here is a measure of the time since the entry into state A. 
DEFINITION 
P -1 Times the Probabi 1-
ity intensity of re-
entering state A exactly 
t time units after the 
previous entry. 
Probability of being in 
state A at time t when P A 
= PB = 1 
Probability of being in 
state B at time t when 
PA = PB = 1 
Probability of being in 
state AE or BE at time t 
when PA = PB = 1 
..... 
..... 
0'1 
FUNCTION 
Pe(t) 
Pe(t) 
Pf(t) 
"'A(t) 
Table 4.2-2 (Continued) 
Single-Fault Model Equations 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
e- at p (t) d(t} + p f: cp (i-u) Pe(t} du 
e- at 6 (t) r(t} + p J: cp (t-u) Pe(u}du 
(I-C) f: Pe (u) «t-u}du 
C ft o Pe(·u} «t-u) p+ae-(a+ p } (t-u) a + fJ du + Pe ( t) 
* t Here is a measure of the time since the entry into state A. 
DEFINITION 
Intensity of entry into 
state AE at time t when 
PA = PB = 1 
Intensity of entry into 
state AD from state A at 
time t when PA = PB = 1 
Intensity of entry into 
state F at time t when PA 
= P = 1 B 
Intensity of entry into 
state AD at time t for 
the first time 
I-' 
I-' 
'-I 
FUNCTION 
"'S(t) 
X S(t) 
Pdp(t) 
FX(t) 
Table 4.2-2 (Continued) 
Single-Fault Model Equations 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
~;p f: Pe(u) (1 - e-(a +P) (t-u» ~ (t-u) du 
(l-PB) J: wB(u)e- P(t-u)du 
PA f: WA(u)du + PB J: WB(u)du 
Fx(t) + J: [(l-PA)WA(t-u) + PX B (t-u) FX(u)du 
* t Here is a measure of the time since the entry into state A. 
DEFINITION 
Intensity of entry into 
state SD at time t for 
the first time 
Probabi 1 i ty of havi ng en-
tered state So .for the 
first time and then re-
maining in the benign 
state until time t 
Probability that a fault 
has been diagnosed as 
permanent by time t 
Function rel ati ng prob-
abi lities and intensities 
derived when P A = Ps = 1 
to those same quantities 
when PA & Ps are 
arbitrary 
...... 
...... 
co 
FUNCTION 
PB(t) 
Pi3(t) 
PL(t) 
PDP(t) 
Table 4.2-2 (Continued) 
Single-Fault Model Equations 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
FX(t) with F x(t) = Pb(t) + X B(t) 
FX(t) with Fx(t) = Pa(t) + Pe(t) 
Pb(t) + X B(t) 
+ Pa(t) + Pe(t) 
FX(t) with Fx(t) = NON TRANSIENT FAULTS 
Pa(t) + Pe(t) 
TRANSIENT FAULTS 
FX(t) with Fx(t) = Pdp(t) 
* t Here is a measure of the time since the entry into state A. 
DEFINITION 
Probability of being in 
state B at time t 
Probabi 1 i ty of bei ng ina 
non-benign state at time 
t 
Probability of a latent 
fault 6r undetected error 
at time t 
Probability that a fault 
has been diagnosed as 
permanent by time t 
4.2.2 Oouble...;Fault Coverage Model 
A detailed version of the OFCM, consistent with the SFCM, is shown in 
Figure 4.2-2. CARE-III considers a simplified version whereby a detected 
as non-permanent fault causes immediate failure of the system, e.g., from 
state B1 O2 there is an instantaneous transition either to state B1 OP2 
with probability PA2 or to state OF with probability I-PA2. This change 
is represented by the dashed lines into state OF. This new model will 
result on a higher intensity of entry into state OF and hence a smaller 
(conservative) value for the Reliability of the system. 
The holding times for this model follow the stochastic characteristics of 
those in the SFCM and so the Double-Fault Model is also a semi -Markov 
, 
process. The transition probability densities, Qij(t), are given in 
Table 4.2-3. 
Figure 4.2-3 represents the Double Fault Coverage Model as given by J. J. 
Stiffler and L. A. Bryant (1982). It should be noted that in this 
representation, the parameters for transitions into states Fand 0 do not 
correspond to competing transitions as is the case for such graphical 
representations of semi-Markov processes. 
Using the formulas of the Appendix, and given the functions c1(t), c3(t), 
c4(t) and f 1(t) as defined in Table 4.2-4, it follows that 
POF(t} = cl (t} + j(t f l (x} P4(t-x} dx, 
where P4(t), the intensity of entry into state F t units of time after 
entry into state Bl B2, ;s given by 
P4(t} = c4(t} + j(t c3(x} P4(t-x} dx. 
Straightforward analysis, e.g., using Laplace transforms, show that these 
formulas are equivalent to those given in Table 4.2-4. 
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TABLE 4.2-3 Double Fault Coverage Model 
Transition Probability Densities Qij(t) 
A1B2 B1B2 
f 1(t) 
f 2(t) 
P 1 (t) b2(t) 
D F . 
PA 62(t)a2(t)r2(t)b1(t) c1(t) 2 
PA 61(t)a1(t)r1(t)b2(t) c2(t) 1 
ci(t), fi(t) as given in table 4.2-4 
P i(t) = Pi eXP(-Pi t ) bi(t) = exp(-Pit) 
a . (t) = a . exp ( - a . t) 111 a· (t) = exp (- a . t) 1 1 
Figure 4.2-3 CARE III Doubl~ Fault Coverage Model 
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FUNCTION 
c;(t) 
i = 1,2 
j = 3-; 
...... 
N 
W 
f i (t) 
; = 1,2 
j = 3-; 
c4(t) 
Table 4.2-4 . 
Double-Fault Model Equat;ons 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
,B;(t)dj(t)rj(t)aj(t) + 
(1-PA·)b.(t) 6.(t)r.(t)a.(t) J 1 J J J 
b;(t)dj(t) Pj(t)aj(t) 
aj(t)bi(t)dj(t)rj(t) 
f: h (t-u) .B 2(u)b1 (u) + 
c2(t-u),B1(u)b2(u) ] du 
+ 
DEFINITION -. 
Transition density from state 
AjBi to state F 
Trans;tion density from state 
AjBi to state B1B2 
Intensity of entry into state 
F t time units after last 
entry into state B1B2 
I-' 
N 
~ 
FUNCTION 
c3(t) 
P3(t) 
PDF(t) 
Table 4.2-4 (Continued) 
Double-Fault Model Equations 
MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION* 
f: [f1(t-U)P2(U)b1(U) + 
f2(t-u )t11(U)b2(U)] du 
• 
f
t . 
f 1(t) + 0 c3(t-u)P3(u)du 
c1(t) + J:t c4(t-u)P3(u)du 
DEFINITION 
Intensity of re-entry into 
state B1 B2 t time units after 
a previous entry 
Intensity of last entry into 
state B1 B2 t time units after 
entry into state A2B1 
Intensity of entry into state 
F t time units after entry 
into state A2B1 
• 
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION IN CARE-III 
In the previous sections the formulation of the coverage model was 
reviewed; now, the implementation of the model in the program, COVRGE, 
will be described in some detail. The objective of this section is to 
document the model that is actually implemented and outline the calcula-
tions performed. In the following sections, the overall structure and 
data flow of the COVRGE program are described, the solution of the cover-
age model is outlined and the basic coverage functions are defined. 
4.3.1 Overview of COVRGE Program 
Figure 4.3-1 illustrates the overall data flow for the COVRGE program. 
The user's input data for the coverage model is read from file CREIN by 
the input program CAREIN; it includes the fault type parameters: C1, fJ, 
,}, p, e, ,} F' PF and e F' After the data is checked and preprocessed 
by CAREIN, it is passed to COVRGE on file COVIN. Then the coverage model 
is solved for each fault type by COVRGE and the functions PDP' PL, PF' PB, 
'B and PDF are computed. The moments of the coverage functions are 
computed and passed to the reliability program CARE3, on file CVGMTS. In 
addition the coverage functions are passed to the plotting program, 
CVGPLT, on files SNGFL, and DBlFL. 
Figure 4.3-2 provides a high level functional description of the COVRGE 
program; a brief explanation of the functions in the figure follows: 
• Computation Control 
These subroutines control the computations for solving the single and 
double fault model S; the details of the computational sequence are given 
in Section 4.3-2. Figures 4.3-3 and 4~3-4 illustrate the control 
structure of subroutines SNGFlT and DBLFLT with call trees; from a control 
point of view the two subroutines are quite similar. 
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• Single and Double Fault Functions 
The subroutines in thi s group compute the bas i c di stri but i on and survi va 1 
function for the coverage model and the elementary functions used in the 
solution of the coverage equations; the function definitions are given in 
Section 4.3.3. 
• Numerical Integration 
The subroutines in this group are used to numerically compute the integral 
(over a time interval) of a function. This kind of calculation is 
required in the coverage model solution and for the evaluation of the 
moments of the coverage functions. The numerical methods used in these 
subroutines are discussed detail in Section 4.4. 
• Numerical Convolution 
The subroutines in this group are used to numerically compute the convol-
ution of two functions and to solve Volterra integral equations of the 
second kind. This kind of calculation is required in the coverage 
solution. These are the most crucial numerical subroutines in the COVRGE 
program; the numerical methods used are discussed in detail in Section 
4.4. 
• Support Functions 
These are "l i brary" type subroutines whi ch are used by all the other sub-
routines in the program for very basic operations or calculations. 
Figure 4.3-5 illustrates the data structure used in the COVRGE program to 
store all functions of time that are computed during the course of the 
solution of the coverage model; this data structure will be referred to as 
a CARE-III, Type A function array. The figure shows that the discrete 
time array has a special structure: the step size only increases, 
126 
monotonically by fac;tors of two. This· data structure reflects the 
expectation, on the part of the CARE-III developers, that all functions of 
interest rapidly decay to zero or a steady-state value. The impact of 
this data structure on the performance of the numerical software .in the 
COVRG program will be discussed in Section 4.4. 
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FIGURE 4.3-3 
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DBlFlT 
FIGURE 4.3-4 
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FIGURE 4.3-S CARE-III Type-A Function Array 
4.3.2 Outline of Calculations 
The evaluation of the output coverage functions is performed by 
subroutines SNGFLT and DBLFLT under the control of the main program 
COVRGE. For each fault type, SNGFLT performs a series of calculations to 
evaluate all the equations of the single .fault coverage model listed in 
Table 4.2-2. Moments of the functions PDP' PL' PF' PB and PB are output 
by SNGFLT for later use in the reliability calculation. Similarly, for 
each pair of fault types, DBLFLT performs a series of calculations to 
evaluate all the equations of the double fault coverage model listed in 
Table 4.2-4. Moments of the function PDF are output by DBLFLT for later 
use in the reliability calculation. 
The calculations done in SNGFLT and DBLFLT are outlined in Tables 4.3-1 
and 2, respectively. The arrays named as inputs or outputs for each cal-
culation are CARE-III, Type A function arrays (see Figure 4.3-5). The 
calculation types are defined as follows. 
• Function Evaluation (G or F) 
The single fault functions, G1 to G12 , are evaluated by subroutines FGSNGL 
and SFG12 and the double fault functions, FCl' FC2 ' FFl' FF2' FBl' FB2 , 
are evaluated by subroutines FCDBL, FFDBL and FBDBL. In each case the 
function is evaluated under the control of subroutine COMPFUN which stores 
the function values as a CARE-III, Type A function array. 
• Summation (SUM) 
The sum of two functions is computed by subroutine SUMARS and stored as a 
CARE~III, Type A function array. SUMARS expects the two input functions 
to be stored as CARE-III, Type A function arrays: 
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• Integration (INT) 
The integral of a function over a time interval is computed by subroutine 
VSTPINT and stored as a CARE-III, Type A function array. VSTPINT expects 
the input function to be stored as a CARE-III, Type A function array. 
• Convolution (CNV) 
The convo 1 ut i on of two funct ions is computed by subrout i ne PREVNRC (and 
VL TNREC) and stored as a CARE- III, Type A funct i on array. PREVNRC expects 
the two input functions to be stored as CARE-III, Type A function arrays. 
• Volterra Integral Equation (VIE) 
The solution of a Volterra integral equation defined by an input function 
and a kernel function is computated by subroutines VOLT ERA or CVLTAR and 
stored as a CARE-III, Type a function array. VOLT ERA and CVLTAR expect 
the input and kernel functions to be stored as CARE-III, Type A function 
arrays. 
The numerical procedures for computing sums, integrals, convolutions and 
solving Volterra integral equations are discussed in detail in 
Section 4.4. 
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TABLE 4.3-1 
SINGLE FAULT CALCULATIONS 
Calculation 
Function Type Subroutine Input Arrays Output· Arrays 
1. g G1 FGSNGL-1 FEEAR 
2. Pa G2 FSGNGL-2 GAR 
VIE VOLTERA GAR,FEEAR PA 
3. Pb VIE VOLTERA FEEAR,FEEAR PB1 
4. Pe G3 FGSNGL-3 GAR 
G4 FGSNGL-4 PERR 
CNV PREVNRC O.,PEER,GAR FAR 
...... VIE VOLTERA FAR,FEEAR PEER w U'I 
5. Pe VIE GAR,FEEAR PEAR 
6. P-e G5 FGSNGL-5 GAR 
VIE VOLTERA GAR,FEEAR PNEAR 
7. Pf G6 FGSNGL-6 GAR 
CNV PREVNRC O.,GAR,PEAR PFLD 
S. 
"'A G7 FGSNGL-7 GAR 
CNV PREVNRC PNEAR,GAR,PEAR .PSIA 
9. 
"'B GS FGSNGL-S GAR 
CNV PREVNRC O.,GAR,PEAR PSIB 
10. XB G9 FGSNGL-9 GAR 
CNV PREVNRC O.,GAR,PSIB PB2 
TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued) 
Calculation 
Function Type Subroutine Input Arrays Output Arrays 
ll. Pdp INT VSTPINT PSIA GAR 
INT VSTPINT PSIB FAR 
SUM SUMARS PSIA,PSIB PDP 
12. ( 1. -P A )'1' A + ( 1. -P B) (3 'I' B SUM SUMARS PSIA,PSB2 FEEAR 
13. 
€ INT VSTPINT FEEAR FAR 
14. PDP VIE CVLTAR PDP PDP ...... 
w 
0\ 15. PA VIE CVLTAR PA PA 
16. PB1 VIE CVLTAR PBI PBI 
17. PB2 VIE CVLTAR PB2 PB2 
18. PE VIE CVLTAR PERR PERR 
19. PF VIE CVLTAR PFLD PFLD 
20. PB SUM SUMARS PBI,PB2 PBNG 
2l. P- SUM SUMARS PA,PERR PNBNG B 
22. PL SUM SUMARS PBNG,PNBNG PLAT 
TABLE 4.3-2 
DOUBLE FAULT CALCULATIONS 
Calculation 
Function Type Subroutine Input Arrays Out(!ut Arrays 
• 
1. C 1 FCl FCDBL-l CIAR 
2. C2 FC2 FCDBL-2 C2AR 
3. fl FFl FFDBL-l FlAR 
4. f2 FF2 FFDBL-2 F2AR 
5. bl FBI FBDBL-l BIAR 
...... 
6. b2 FB2 FBDBL-2 B2AR (.oJ 
..... 
7. . C4 CNV PREVNRC O.,ClAR,BlAR XBlINTG 
CNV PREVNRC 0.,C2AR,B2AR XB2INTG 
SUM SUMARS XBlINTG,XB2INTG. C4AR 
8. C3 CNV PREVNRC O.,FlAR,BlAR XBlINTG 
CNV PREVNRC o. ,FlAR,B2AR XBlINTG 
SUM SUMARS XBlINTG,XB2INTG C3AR 
9. P3 VIE VOLTERA FlAR,C3AR P3AR 
10. PDF VIE VOLTERA ClAR,C4AR PDFAR 
4.3.3 Basic Coverage Functions 
The basic coverage functions are the distribution and survival functions 
for the various fault types and the elementary functions used in the 
evaluation of the equations for the coverage model (see Section 4.2). The 
distribution and survival functions are computed in subroutines CNSRTDN 
and RTDNINT, respectively. The single fault functions, G1 to G12 are 
computed in subroutines FGSNGL and SFG12 and the double fault funct'ions 
FC ' FC ' FF ' FF ' FB ,FB are computed in subroutines FCDBL, FFDBL and 1 2 1 2 1 2 
FBDBL. 
For a faul t type, with parameters a, fJ, 6, P, e, 6 F' P F' and e F 
(see Section 4.2), the distribution and survival functions are computed as 
foll ows. 
• Active-to-Benign Transition: 
a (t) = a e - at 4.3-1 
a(t)=e- at 4.3-2 
• Benign-to-Active Transition: 
fJ(t) = fJe -fJt 4.3-3 
b(t) = e -fJt 4.3-4 
• Fault Detection: 
6 e - 6t 6 F = • F. 
6 (t) = 6 6 F = • T. o . ~ t ~ 1./6 4.3-5 
o. 6 F = ; T. t > 1./6 
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e - 6 t 
d(t) = 1.-t6 
o. 
• Error Generation: 
pe -pt 
P (t) = P 
O. 
e - pt 
r(t) = 1. - P t 
o. 
• Error Propagation: 
e (t) = 
- et ee 
o. 
6 F = .F. 
6 F = • T. O. ~ t ~ 1./6 4.3-6 
6 F = • T. t > 1./6 
PF = .F. 
P F = • T. O. < t ~ LIP 4.3-7 
; P F = • T. , t > LIp 
PF = .F. 
P F = • T. O. ~ t ~ 1.lp 4.3-8 
P F = • T. t > LIp 
e F = .F. 
e F = • T. O. ~ t ~ LIe 4.3-9 
e F =. T. , t ~ 1./e 
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- e t 
• F ~ e e F = 
e(t) = 1. - et . e F = .T. o. ~ t ~ 1. Ie 4.3-10 , 
o. e F = .T. t > 1. Ie 
For a fault type, with parameters a, fJ, 6, P, e, 6 F' P F' e F (see 
Section 4.2), the single fault function G1 to G12 are computed as follows: 
• G1 Function: 
G1 (t) = l/> = GlO (t), with P - a in place of fJ 4.3-11 
• G2 Function: 
G2 (t) = a(t) r(t) d(t), 4.3-12 
• G3 Function: 
63 (t) = a(t) p (t) d(t), 4.3-13 
• G4 Function: 
G4 (t) = e(t), 4.3-14 
• G5 Function: 
Gs (t) = a(t) r(t) 6 (t), 4.3-15 
• G6 Function: 
G6 (t) = e (t), 4.3-16 
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• 67 Function: 
e (t) ; a + fJ = O. 
67 (t) = 4.3-17 
e (t)· aa(t}b(t) + fJ ; a + fJ ~ O. 
a+fJ 
• 68 Function: 
68 (t) = e (t) (1.-a(t}b(t)} 4.3-18 
• 69 Function: 
69 (t) = b(t} 4.3-19 
... 610 Function: 
t 
610 (t) = ae - at i e - fJ (t-u)d(u)r(u}du 
o 
• Case 1: a = O. 
• Case 2: a > 0., 6 F = .F., P F = .F. 4.3-20 
a a ( t) tb (t) P + 6' = fJ 
610 = 4.3-21 
aa(t) b(t)-r(t)d(t) : P + 6 ~ fJ 
P+6-fJ 
• Case 3: a>0.,6 F =.T.,PF =.F. andP-fJ~O. 
to = min (t, 1./6 ) 4.3-22 
141 
exp 1 = e _(a +P)t 4.3-23 
exp 2 = e -(a+p)t e -(p-P)to 4.3-24 
term 1 = (1./ (p - P)) (exp 1 - exp 2) 4.3-25 
term 2 = (6 / (p - P ) 2) (exp 1 - exp 2 (1. + (p - P) to)) 
4.3-26 
GlO (t) = a (term 1 - term 2) 4.3-27 
• Case 3b: a~O., 6 F = .T., PF = .F. and P-P= O. 
= mi n (t, 1. /6 ) 4.3-28 
= ae -(a+p)t (t _ 1/2 6 t 2) 
o 0 4.3-29 
• Cas e 4 a: a > 0., 6 F = • F., 6 T = • T. an d 6 .- P "! o. 
= min (t, 1./p) 4.3-30 
_ -(a +P)t 
- e . 4.3-31 
exp 2 = e - (a + P ) t e - (6 - P ) to 4.3-32 
term 1 = (1./(6 -P)) (exp 1- exp 2) 4.3-33 
term 2 
4.3-34 
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GlQ(t) = ex (term 1 - term 2) 
• Case 4b: ex ~ 0., 6 F =·F., 6 T = • T. and 6 - /J = O. 
to = min (t, 1./p) 
GlO (t) = ex e -(ex +/J)t (t - 1/2 0 P t 2) 0 
• Case 5a: ex > 0., 6 F = .T., P F = .T. and /J f. O. 
exp 1 
exp 2 
term 1 
term 2 
term 3 
= mi n ( t, 1. / 6, 1. / P ) 
= e -(ex +/J)t e /J t o 
= e -(ex +/J)t 
= (1.//J) (exp 1 - exp 2) 
= ((6 +p)//J2) (exp 1 (1.-,8t
o
) - exp 2) 
G10 (t) = (term 1 + term 2 + term 3) 
• Case 5b: ex> 0., 6"F = .T., P F = .T. and /J = O. 
= mi n ( t , 1. / 6 , 1. / P ) 
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4.3-35 
4.3-36 
4.3-37 
4.3-38 
4.3-39 
4.3-40 
4.3-41 
4.3-42 
4.3-43 
4.3-44 
4.3-45 
GlO (t) = a e - at (to - 1/2 ({} + p) t 2 + 1/3 0 {}p to 3) 
4.3-46 
• Gll Functi on: 
a 
Gll (t) = a +/3 a(t) b(t) 4.3-47 
• G12 Function: 
/3 
G12 (t) = a+/3 (G1 (t) - G10 (t)) + G2 (t) 4.3-48 
For a pair of fault types, with parameters ai' fJ i' {} i' e i; and a j' 
fJ j' P j' e j; (see Section 4.2), the double fault function FCl ' FC2 ' FFl ' 
FF ' FB ,FB are computed as follows. 2 1 2 
• Fe Function: 
1 
• FC Function: 
2 
+ (1.- PA)bi(t) {} j(t)rj(t)aj(t) 
J 
+ bi(t)dj(t) Pj(t)aj(t) 
+ b.(t)d.(t)p.(t)a.(t) J 1 1 1 
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4.3-49 
4.3-50 
• FF Function: 
1 
FF (t) = Ct. ( t) b . ( t) d . (t) r . (t) 1 1 J 1 1 
• FF Function: 2 ' 
FF ( t ) = Ct • ( t) b . (t) d . ( t ) r . ( t) 2 _ J 1 J J 
• FB Function: 
1 
FBI (t) =, bi (t) P j (t) 
• FB Function: 
2 
4.3-51 
4.3-52 
4.3-53 
4.3-54 
BCS has identified a coding error in subroutine FGSNGL for the calculation 
of GlQ(t), Case 5a; in equation 4.3-42 the order of the terms exp 1 and 
exp 2 should be switched. 
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4.4 COMPUTATIONAL METHODS 
In the previous section the implementation of the coverage model in the 
COVRGE program was outlined, now, the computational methods used to solve 
the model equations will be reviewed. The objective of this section is to 
document the numerical procedures that are implemented .and present the BCS 
evaluation of these algorithms in the CARE-III environment. In the fol-
lowing sections the numerical procedures are first highl ighted and then 
discussed in detail. 
4.4.1 Overview of Algorithms 
In this section each of the numerical procedures used in the COVRGE pro-
gram is highlighted. The requirements for the algorithm and its implemen-
tation are discussed first, followed by a preview of the BCS analysis of 
the algorithm in the CARE-III context. In the succeeding sections a de-
tailed description and analysis of each algorithm is provided. 
• Numerical Sum 
The calculation of several of the functions in the single and double 
fault coverage models (Pdp' E, PB' Ps' PL' C3 and C4) require the 
calculation of the sum of two functions. The surrmation procedure 
uses linear interpolation and is implemented in subroutine SUMARS. 
It is designed to compute the sum: 
4.4-1 
for input functions stored in CARE-III, Type A function arrays. The 
output function is stored in a CARE-III, Type A function array which 
has discrete time points selected by the numerical procedure (in 
subroutine SUMARS). 
146 
BCS has carefully reviewed SUMARS and the subroutines which it uses; no 
programming errors in the implementation of the summation calculation were 
detected by the revi ew (wi th the except i on of some mi nor quest ions; see 
Section 4.4.2). BCS has raised questions about several of the heuristics 
used in the summation calculation: step size control and zero detection; 
these questions are addressed in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.6. 
• Numerical Integration 
The calculation of several of the functions in the single fault 
coverage model (Pdp, E) require the calcul ation of. the integral of a 
function. In addition the output of the COVRGE program is the 
moments (for p = 0,1,2) of the single and double fault functions, 
POP,PL,PF'PB,PS and POF. The numerical integration procedure is 
based on Simpson's Rule and is implemented in subroutines VSTPINT and 
SIMPINT. It is designed to compute the integrals: 
4.4-2 
for input functions which are stored in CARE-III, Type A function 
arrays. The output moment is stored in a CARE-III, Type A function 
array which has the same discrete time points as the input function. 
BCS has carefully reviewed VSTPINT, SIMPINT and all the subroutines which 
they use; no programming errors in the implementation of Simpson's Rule 
were detected by the review. 
• Numerical Convolution 
The calculation of several of the functions in the single and double 
fault coverage models (Pe, Pf' .vA' .vB' XB, C4, C3) requires the 
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calculation of the convolution of two functions. The numerical 
convolution procedure is based on the Trapezoidal Rule and is 
implemented in subroutines PREVNRC, VLTNREC and CNVLINT. It is 
designed to compute the convolution: 
f 't y(t) = f(t) + /1., cf> (t-r) g (r) dr,' o 4.4-3 
for input functions which are stored in CARE-III, Type A function 
arrays. The output function is stored in a CARE-III, Type A function 
array which has discrete time points selected by the numerical 
procedure (in subroutine VLTNREC). 
BCS has carefully revi ewed PREVNRC, VL TNREC, CNVLINT and the subroutines 
which they use; no programming errors in the implementation of the 
convolution calculation were detected by the review (with the exception of 
some minor questions on CNVLlNT; see Section 4.4.4). BCS has raised 
questions about several of the heuristics used in the convolution 
calculations: step size control, zero detection and constant value 
detection; these questions are addressed in Sections 4.4.4 and 4.4.6. 
• Numerical Solution of Volterra Integral Equations 
The solution of Volterra integral equations of the second kind is an 
essential calculation for the single and double fault coverage 
models; such solutions are required to compute P a' P e' Pe' PDP' PA' 
PB1' PB2' PE' PF' P3' PDF· The numerical solution procedure is based 
on the Trapezoidal Rule and is implemented in subroutines VOLTERA, 
CVLTAR and CNVLINT. It is designed to solve integral equations of 
the form: 
y(t) = f(t) +/1 it cf> (t-r) y (r) dr, 
o 
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4.4-4 
for input functions which are stored in CARE-III, Type A function 
arrays. The output function is stored in a CARE-III, Type A function 
array which has discrete time pOints selected by the numerical 
procedure (i n subroutine VOL TERA) • Subrout i ne VOL TERA solves 
equati on 4.4-4 directly for yet) and CVLTAR computes the solution 
indirectly by solving a Volterra integral equation for y(t)-f(t). 
BCS has carefully reviewed VOLTERA, CVLTAR, CNVLINT and the subroutines 
which they use; no programming errors in the implementation of the 
Volterra integral equation solution algorithm were detected by the review. 
BCS has raised questions about several of the heuristics used in the 
solution algorithm: step size control, zero detection and constant value 
detection; these questions are addressed in Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6. In 
addition, BCS has raised the important question of the numerical stability 
of the solution algorithm; this question is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.4.5. 
4.4.2 Numerical Sum 
The numerical procedure used for calculating the sum of functions uses 
linear interpolation and is implemented in subroutine SUMARS. The input 
functions must be stored in a CARE-III, Type A function array and the sum 
is computed for a selected set of discrete time points: 
4.4-5 
The discrete time points for the sum" function are automatically selected 
by SUMARS and the sum function is stored as a CARE-III, Type A function 
array. 
The sum is computed with a step-by-step procedure that is initiated by 
setting: 
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sl = 0., 4.4-6 
4.4-7 
The kth step consists of selecting a step size L1 tkfor the step and then 
computing the sum at: 
4.4-8 
4.4-9 
Linear interpolation is used to evaluate the Yl and Y2 functions at the 
discrete time points indicated in the sum in equation 4.4-9. 
The summation procedure is monitored by heuristic controls which determine 
when the sum function is zero or may be truncated, select the stepsize 
L1 tk and determine when the sum function cannot be obtained in the 
available space in a CARE-III function array; each of these controls is 
briefly described below. 
The summation procedure is terminated after computing Yk if one of the 
following conditions is met: 
• Yk,,;;;;TRUNC (default value = .0001) and sk > maximum time for Yl 
and Y2 functions, 
• STDYFLG is set true and sk ~ FT (the flight time in hours), 
• STDYFLG is set true and the maximum number of step doub 1 i ngs 
have been made •. 
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The stepsize for the summation procedure is doubled after computing Yk if 
the following condition is met: 
The variable ZERODF (default value = .05), used to control the stepsize 
heuristic, is controlled to obtain the sum function in the available space 
as follows: 
• ZERODF = ZERODF - DIFCHNG 
when the maximum number of step doublings is exceeded, 
• ZERODF = ZERODF + DIFCHNG 
when the maximum number of function values is exceeded. 
In both these cases the entire sum function is recomputed one more time; 
if either re-occurs an error message is displ ayed and the COVRGE program 
is terminated. 
4.4.3 Numerical Integration 
The numerical integration procedure used in the COVRGE program is based on 
Simpson's Rule and is implemented in subroutines VSTPINT and SIMPINT. The 
input function must be stored in a CARE-III Type A function array and the 
p!!!. moment of the function is evaluated at the same discrete time points 
as the input function: 
j = 1,2,····'jmax 4.4-10 
4.4-11 
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Subroutine VSTPINT computes: 
n-1 t t. Y p .L Jm+1 7" Pf( 7")d 7" + f J TPf{ T)dT j = 
m=l t. t. Jm I n 
where (refer to Figure 4.3-5) 
n-1 
j = 1 + k + L Nm , 1 ~ k ~ Nn, 1 ~ n ~ Nmax 
m=l 
jn = {I 
1 + 
n = 1 
n = 2,3 ••• ,Nmax 
, j = 1,2,···,jmax 
4.4-12 
4.4-13 
4.4-14 
and the integrals (over the fixed stepsize intervals) are computed in sub-
routine SIMPINT via Simpson's Rule. For efficiency, the values of the 
integrals: 
are saved by VSTPINT and Y~ is computed as follows: 
y~ = 
J 
n-1 
L 
m=l 
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4.4-15 
4.4-16 
Subroutine SIMPINT computes the integrals: 
where the index j is defined by VSTPINT as follows: 
The integrals are evalued by Simpson's Rule: 
• Case 1: j = j m 
• Case 2: j - j = 1 m 
P 2
m
-
1 Lit ( P I ( t .) = 6 y. It. 1 m J J- J-
hi + Yj) 
+ 4, 2 
• Case 3: j-jm > 1, j-jm even 
j-2 
= L* 
i=j m 
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4.4-17 
4.4-18 
4.4-19 
4.4-20 
4.4-21 
• Case 4: j-jm > 1, j-jm odd 
+ 3 
"8 
j-3 
L:* 
i=j 1 m-
(
' P P P p) y. 3 t. 3 + 3y. 2 t. 2 + 3 y. 1 t. 1 + y. t. J- J- J- J- J- J- J J 
*,Increment i by 2's 
4.4.4 Numerical Convolution 
4.4-22 
The numerical convolution procedure used in the COVRGE program approxi-
mates the convolution integral with a discrete sum based on the Trape-
zoidal Rule and is implemented in subroutines PREVNRC, VLTNREC and 
CNVLINT. The input functions must be stored in a CARE-III, Type A func-
tion array and the convolution is computed for a selected set of discrete 
time points: 
4.4-23 
The discrete time points for the output function are automatically select-
ed by VLTNREC and the output is stored as a CARE-III, Type A function 
array. 
The convolution is computed with a step-by-step procedure that is 
initiated by setting: 
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4.4-24 
4.4-25 
The kth step consists of selecting a stepsize L1 tk for the step and then 
computing the convolution integral at 
4.4-26 
Writing the discrete time points for the 4> and 9 functions as the sets: 
T 4> = {tf: l~j~jm~x} , 4.4-27 
T = 
9 {tJ : 1 . .g } ~J~J .' max 4.4-28 
the discrete time points used for the approximation of the convolution in-
tegral at sk+l are 
_ k Tk = {tj 1~ j~N}, Tk - T4> u g 4.4-29 
where 
k _ 
{Sk+1-t f : tel! 1 ~ j ~ . 4>} T4> - J ~ sk+l' J max ' 4.4-30 
k _ 
{t3 t~ ~. sk+l' 1 ~ j ~ .g } Tg - J "" Jmax ' 4.4-31 
and the tj in Tk are numbered so that the tj are increasing in size. 
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It is noted that: 
4.4-31 
4.4-32 
The value of Yk+l is computed by applying the Trapezoidal Rule to evaluate 
the convolution integral at sk+l (in subroutine (CNVLINT): 
Yk+l = f(tn) +P [lo t 2<P(tN)g(t1) + 1o(tN-tN_1) <p(t1)g(tN) 
N-l 
+L 4.4-33 
n=2 
Linear interpolation is used to evaluate the f, ~ and g functions at the 
discrete time points indicated in the sum in equation 4.4-33. 
The convolution procedure is monitored by heuristic controls which 
determi ne when the convo 1 ut ion is zero or may be truncated, select the 
steps i zes L1 tk and determi ne when the convo 1 ut i on cannot be obtained in 
the available space in a CARE-III, Type A function array; each of these 
controls is briefly described below. 
The convolution procedure is terminated after computing Yk if one of the 
following conditions is met: 
• Yk~TRUNC (default value = .0001) and maximum number of step 
doublings have been made, 
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(default value = .0005) and maximum number of step doublings have 
been made. 
The stepsize for the convolution procedure is doubled after computing Yk 
if the following condition is met: 
The variable ZERODF (default value = .05), used to control the stepsize 
doubling heuristic, is controlled to obtain the convolution in the 
available space as follows: 
• ZERODF = ZERODF - DIFCHNG; 
when the maximum number of step doublings is exceeded, 
'. ZERODF = ZERODF + DIFCHNG; 
when the maximum number of function values is exceeded. 
In both these cases the entire convolution is recomputed one more time; if 
either case re-occurs an error message is displayed and the COVRGE program 
is terminated. 
4.4.5 Numerical Solution of Volterra Integral Equation 
The numerical procedure used in the COVRGE program to solve Volterra in-
tegral equations of the second kind is based on the numerical convolution 
procedure described in Section 4.4.3 and is implemented in subroutine 
VOLTERA and CNVLINT. The input functions must be stored in a CARE-III, 
Type A function array and the solution is computed for a selected set of 
discrete time points: 
tP (sk-r)y(r)dr; k=I,2, ••• ,kmax • 4.4-34 
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The discrete time points for the solution are automatically selected by 
VOLTERA and the solution is stored as a CARE-III, Type A function array. 
The solution is computed with a step-by-step procedure that is initiated 
by setting: 
4.4-35 
4.4-36 
The kth step consists of selecting a stepsize .1 tk for the step and then 
solving the integral equation at 
4.4-37 
First the set of discrete time points needed for approximation of the con-
volution integral at sk+l is selected in the manner outlined in Section 
4.4.4: 
4.4-38 
and it is noted that: 
4.4-39 
4.4-40 
4.4-41 
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For 0'::;;; t .::;;; t M, y{t) can be estimated by linear interpolation from the 
known values, Yl'Y2"'Yk of y at the discrete times sl's2, .. ,sk' For 
tM< t.::;;; tN' y(t) must be estimated by linear interpolation of the values 
of y at tN and tM: 
4.4-42 
4.4-43 
The value of Yk+1 is computed by applying the Trapezoidal Rule to evaluate 
the convolution integral at sk+1 (in subroutine CNVLINT): 
4.4-44 
159 
Yk+l = f( t N) + P [" t2 4>( t N) Yl + .. (tN-tN_1) 4> (t1) Yk+ 1 
M 
L Jz (tn+1-tn_1)4'(tN-tn) y (tn) 
n=2 
+ 
+ " Jz (tn+1-tn_1) 4' (tN-tn) y N n + y n M 
N-1 ( t -t t -t )] 
~ = M+1 k tN-tM k+1 tn-tM 
4.4-45 
4.4-46 
Linear interpolation is used to evaluate the f, 4' and y functions at the 
discrete time points indicated in equation 4.4-46. 
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The solution procedure is monitored by heuristic controls which determine 
when the solution is zero or may be truncated, select the stepsizes Litk 
and determine when a solution cannot be obtained in the available space in 
a CARE-III, Type A function array; each of these controls is briefly 
described below. 
The solution procedure is terminated after computing Yk if one of the 
following conditions is met: 
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• Yk ~ REALMIN (default value = 10 ), 
• Yk ~ TRUNC (default value = .0001), 
and sk > maximum time for t/J function, 
• Yk ~ TRUNC (default value = .0001), 
and maximum number of step doublings have been made, 
• STDYFLG is set true and sk ~ FT (the flight time in hours), 
• STDYFLG is set true and the maximum number of step doub 1 i ngs have 
been made. 
The stepsize for the solution procedure is doubled after computing Yk if 
one of the following conditions is met: 
• IYk-Yk_21/max (Yk-2'Yk-1'Yk) ~ ZERODF; 
The stepsize is doubled if y(t) has not had a relative maxima or 
minima in IHLDDUB steps. In addition the control flag STDYFLG is 
set to true if y(t) does not have a relative maxima or minima at 
sk· 
• IYk-Yk-11 /max (Yk-2'Yk-1'Yk) ~. ZERODF; 
The stepsize is doubled if y(t) has not had a relative maxima or 
minima inIHLDDUB steps. 
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The variable ZERODF (default value = .05), used to control the stepsize 
doubling heuristic, is controlled to obtain the solution in the available 
space as follows: 
• ZERODF = ZERODF - DIFCHNG; 
when the maximum number of step doublings is exceeded, 
• ZERODF = ZERODF + DIFCHNG; 
when the maximum number of function values is exceeded and the 
last value of y is less than 1., 
• ZERODF = ZERODF - DIFCHNG; 
when the maximum number of function values is exceeded and the 
last value of y is greater than 1. 
In both these cases the entire solution is recomputed one more time; if 
either case re-occurs an error message is displayed and the COVRGE program 
. is terminated. 
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A. APPENDIX 
A.O MARKOV AND SEMI-MARKOV PROCESSES 
This appendix gives brief descriptions and some properties of Markov and 
Semi-Markov processes. References on these topics are Parzen (1967), 
Feller (1968), Ross (1970) and Cinlar (1975). 
Consider a physical system that moves from one state to another with ran-
dom sojourn times in between. Assume that the number of possible states 
is finite, and the paths that follow the state of the system are right 
continuous and piecewise constant: 
Le., if X(O), X(l), are the successive 
o = T(O) <: T( 1) <;; ••• are the successive times of jump; 
state of the system at the time t, then the system starts 
time T(O)=O, and remains there until time T(l), 
yet) = X(O) for T(O) <;; t < T(l); 
states visited; 
and yet) is the 
in state X(O) at 
at time T(l) it jumps to state X(l) and remains there until time T(2), 
yet) = X(l) for T(l) <;; t <T(2); and so on. 
In general 
Y ( t ) = X (n ) for T ( n) <;; t < T ( N+ 1 ) • 
Equivalently, 
X(n) = Y(T(n)), and 
T(n) = inf {t ~ T(n-1) / yet) ; Y(T(n-1))} •. 
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The processes V= {vt : t~O} and (X,T) = {(Xn,Tn):n~o} are "equivalent" in 
the sense that they give the same information. 
The problem is to determine the state probabilities 
Pij(t) = P [V(t) = j I V(O) = ~ 
under some assumptions on the stochastic model (time homogeneity, indepen-
dence from past history, distributions of sojourn times). 
The following notation will be used 
Q i j ( t) = P [X ( n+ 1) = j', T ( n+ 1) - T ( n) ~ t I X (n ) = i] , 
Qij = P [X(n+l) = j I X(n) = i] = Qij(oo) 
Gij(t) = p[T(n+l) - T(n) ~ t I X(n) = i, X(n+l)=jJ = Qij(t)/Qij. 
A.l MARKOV PROCESSES 
Definition V = {V(t) : t~o} is said to be a Markov process if 
p[ V ( t+s) = j I V ( u) : u ~t ] = P [V ( t+s) = j I V ( t) ] 
for all t, s~o. I.e., the future of the process is independent of its 
past provided that the present state is known. 
If Pij(s,t) is used to denote the probability that the system is in state 
j at time t, given that it was in state i at time s (s~), then these 
satisfy the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations, 
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Assumptions 
(a) For every state i there is a non-negative continuous function 
Ai (t) such that 
[1 - Pii(t, t+h)] /h tends to Ai(t) as h tends to O. 
(b) For each pair of distinct states i, j, there corresponds tran-
sition probabilities qij(t) such that 
Pij(t, t+h)/h tends tOAi(t) qij(t) as h tends to o. 
The functions qij(t} are continuous in t, equal to zero when i=j, and for 
each fixed i add up to one. 
The state probabilities are then evaluated using either the forward or 
backward equations: 
(1) forward equations 
. d piJ"(s,t} = -piJ"(s,t} Aj(t} + L Pik(s,t}Ak(t} qkj(t} 
~ k~ 
P; j ( S , t) = Il; j exp { - [A j ( t) - A / s) J} + 
~ ft Pik(s,u} Ak(u) qkj(u} exp {-[ Aj(t) - Aj(U)]} du, k~J Js 
where A" (t)= ft Aj(U) duo 
J Jo 
(2) backward equations 
d Pi J" ( s , t) = A i ( s ) Pi J" ( s, t) - Ai ( s) L q i k ( s ) P kJ" ( s , t) 
-as k~i 
Pij(s,t) =Il ljexp {-[A;(t) -AI(S)]}+ 
I; (t exp t [Ai(u) -Ai(s)] }Ai(U) qik(u} Pkj(u,t) duo k~' Js l 167 
A.2 HOMOGENEOUS MARKOV PROCESSES 
If in the definition of a Markov process it is also assumed that transi-
tion probabilities Pij(s,t) depend on the times sand t only through their 
difference t-s, then the process is said to be homogeneous and the term 
Pij(t-s) is used instead. 
For this case the functions i and qij are independent of time and so will 
be written without reference to that parameter. Such processes sati sfy 
the following properties: 
(1) p[X(n+1) = j; T(n+1)-T(n) > tIX(o) ••• X(n), T(o), ••. , T(n)]= 
= qij exp ( - Ai t ) when X(n). = i. 
Where q .. ~o, q .. = 0, 2:q .. =1 and O~A.~ 00 
lJ 11 j lJ 1 
The state i is said to be absorbing, stable or instantaneous depending on 
whether Ai=o, O<Ai < 00 , or Ai = CX) • 
(2) X = {X(n) : n~o} is a Markov chain with transition matrix Q = 
[qij} 
(3) The times between jumps are conditionally independent given the 
successive states being visited, and each sojourn time is expo-
nentially distributed with parameter dep~ndent on the state 
being visited, i.e., 
P[T(1)-T(O»U1, .•• , T(n)-T(n-i»un_1 I X(o)=i o' ... , 
The state probabilities are evaluated using either the forward or backward 
equations. e.g., the forward equation becomes 
p .. (t) = 5 .. exp ( -A.t ) + 2: (t P·k(U)A k qk' exp [-A.(t-U)]dU. lJ lJ J k1j)0 1 J J 
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A.3 SEMI-MARKOV PROCESSES 
Definition: V = {V(t) : t~O} is said to be a Semi-Markov process if for 
any s and any time of jump T (T=T(o) or T(I) or ••• ), 
P[V(T+S) = j I V(u) , U~T] = P[V(T+S) = j I V(T)]. 
t . 
i.e., the future and the past are conditionally independent given the 
present if the present is a time of transition. 
Such a process has the following properties: 
(1) X = {X(n) : n~o} is a Markov Chain with transition probability 
matrix Q = [qij]' 
(2) Sojourn times are conditionally independent but their distribu-
tions depend both on the state being visited and the next one. 
Also these distributions are arbitrary (not necessarily exponen-
tial). i.e., 
... , T(n) - T(n-l) ~ un I X(o), ••• , X(n)] = 
= G(X{o), X(I), u1) ••• G(X(n-l), X(n), un)' 
Notation 
Nj(t) = number of tr.ansitions into state j in (0, tJ; 
R .. (t) = 8 .. + E [N.(t) I lJ lJ J V (0) =i ] = expected number 
state j in [0, t] 
initial state is i; 
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of visits to 
given that the 
F .. (t) = P [N.(t) >0 I Y(O)=i] = distribution of time between an lJ J 
Properties 
entry to state i and the first 
next entry to j. 
= Intensity of entry into state j at time t, given that the 
initial state is i. 
( 3) R .. ( t ) = 8.. + ~ (t Q. k ( ds) Rk . ( t- s ) 1 J 1 J k Jo 1 J 
F .. (t) = Q .. (t) +~ (t Q.k(ds) Fk .(t-s) 
lJ lJ k;Ej Jo 1 J 
(4) p .. (t) = (t R .. (ds) h. (t-s) 
lJ Jo lJ J 
= 8 .. h.(t) + ~(t Q.k(ds) Pk.(t-s) 
lJ' k Jo ' J 
= 8 .. h.(t) + (t F .. (ds) P .. (t-s) 
, J' Jo' J JJ 
where 
hi(t) = 1 - ~Qik(t) = p[T(n+l)-T(n»t I X(n)=i] • 
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